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ARTICLES 
TAKING STEEL SEIZURE SERIOUSLY:  
THE IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT AND 
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Samuel Estreicher* & Steven Menashi** 
 
This Article examines the constitutional validity of President Obama’s 
decision, as part of his 2015 agreement with Iran, effectively to repeal 
seventeen different sanctions provisions for the fifteen-year life of the 
agreement.  Although Congress had legislated extensively in this area, the 
President effected this change by entering into a “nonbinding political 
agreement” with Iran and by aggregating individual waiver provisions in the 
sanctions laws into an across-the-board waiver of sanctions.  We argue that 
the commitments made by the President in the Iran agreement violate a 
fundamental separation-of-powers limit on executive power—what we term 
“the Steel Seizure principle,” after Youngstown—the Steel Seizure case. 
As the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed in Steel Seizure, the President does 
not have lawmaking power even where national security and foreign 
relations concerns are at stake.  A vast literature has grown around Steel 
Seizure, especially its influential concurring opinion by Justice Robert 
Jackson.  Yet relatively little attention has been paid to the majority view of 
the Justices that President Truman’s seizure order was unlawful not because 
it contravened any express statutory prohibition but because it flouted the 
congressional “plan” for addressing the particular policy issue.  This aspect 
of Steel Seizure highlights what is particularly problematic about President 
Obama’s decision to aggregate authorities in the sanctions laws and to 
commit the United States to an across-the-board waiver of nuclear-related 
sanctions pursuant to his agreement with Iran.  President Obama treated the 
waiver provisions as an invitation to end the congressionally prescribed 
sanctions regime for addressing Iran’s nuclear weapons program and to 
replace it with his own nonsanctions regime for addressing the same issue.  
Yet the President lacks the unilateral power to overturn Congress’s 
prescribed policy and to replace it with his own. 
 
*  Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. 
**  Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University Scalia Law School.  The authors 
thank Daniel Katz and Daniel Shapiro for research assistance and Laurence Gold, Thomas 
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Faculty Forum at George Mason University for helpful comments.  All remaining errors lie 
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The President can be viewed both as an agent and, particularly in the 
foreign relations area, as a co-principal with Congress.  The Steel Seizure 
principle highlights the limits of the co-principal conception of the 
President’s role in foreign affairs.  Once Congress has developed a 
legislative framework for a subject matter, that framework occupies the field; 
the President’s role becomes one of a responsible agent.  In the Iran 
sanctions laws, Congress provided bounded waiver authority, acting 
responsibly to allow limited executive discretion rather than requiring the 
President to seek new legislation each time flexibility was needed.  It did not, 
however, invite the President to override the sanctions framework altogether. 
An emergent literature in administrative law and U.S. foreign relations 
law has praised Congress’s willingness to delegate waiver authority to the 
President for providing needed flexibility and other policy benefits.  Yet that 
literature recognizes that the President’s exercise of waiver authority must 
be carefully circumscribed to avoid enabling the President effectively to 
revise a statutory regime out of disagreement with Congress’s policy choices.  
Such limiting principles are no less necessary in the foreign affairs context, 
where President Obama used purported waiver authority in the Iran 
sanctions statutes to pursue his own policy in defiance of Congress. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When President Obama signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA), a 2015 agreement with Iran concerning its nuclear program, he 
committed the United States to cease enforcing a sanctions regime that 
Congress had imposed on Iran through legislation over the preceding thirty 
years.1  The European Union also agreed to lift the sanctions it had imposed, 
but it adopted implementing legislation in order to do so.2  The President 
sought no legislation to implement the agreement; the government instead 
acted “pursuant to Presidential authorities” to “ceas[e] the application of the 
statutory nuclear-related sanctions.”3 
The President’s commitment involved a reversal of the usual course of 
lawmaking.  Typically, Congress legislates a policy framework, and the 
President must act within that framework unless it is altered by statute or by 
treaty.4  Overturning that framework requires a new law supported by both 
houses of Congress.  Absent legislation or a treaty—both of which require 
affirmative congressional support—the President may defy legislation5 only 
in the limited area where the President has exclusive executive authority that 
Congress cannot countermand.6  The Obama administration never claimed 
that the decision to impose or to lift sanctions on a foreign state is an area of 
 
 1. See Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action annex II, at 8, U.S. DEP’T ST. (July 14, 2015), 
https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/ [https://perma.cc/7K3R-JL5Y] (“The United 
States commits to cease the application of, and to seek such legislative action as may be 
appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, all nuclear-related 
sanctions as specified in Sections 4.1-4.9 below.”); see also id. at 12 (providing “[t]he United 
States commits to” authorize other trade measures previously the subject of prohibition). 
 2. See id. annex V, at 1–2 (“The EU and its Member States will adopt an EU Regulation, 
taking effect as of Implementation Day, terminating all provisions of the EU Regulation 
implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial EU sanctions as specified in Section 
16.1 of this Annex.”); see also EUR. UNION EXTERNAL ACTION, INFORMATION NOTE ON EU 
SANCTIONS TO BE LIFTED UNDER THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION (JCPOA) 13 
(2016), http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/iran_implementation/information 
_note_eu_sanctions_jcpoa_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LTT-MPLT] (“It is through the adoption 
of legal acts providing the legislative framework for the lifting of EU sanctions that the 
European Union implements UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) in accordance with 
the JCPOA.”). 
 3. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, supra note 1, annex V, at 2. 
 4. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 5. For discussion on the President’s power to terminate treaties, see infra note 196. 
 6. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) 
(“In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully 
executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.  The Constitution limits his functions in 
the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws 
he thinks bad.  And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws 
which the President is to execute.”); see also id. at 637–38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When 
the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his 
power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus 
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.  Courts can sustain exclusive 
presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the 
subject.”). 
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exclusive presidential authority, and any such claim would be highly 
doubtful.7 
In the case of the Iran nuclear agreement, the President could not proceed 
either by statute or by treaty because majorities in both houses of Congress 
opposed the pact.8  Instead, the President acted on the basis of authorities he 
argued he already possessed.  First, the administration claimed that the 
JCPOA was a nonbinding political commitment that the President could 
make on his own rather than a legally binding treaty that required 
congressional approval.9  It is generally recognized that the President may 
“establish commitments of an exclusively political or moral nature” by 
 
 7. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 329 (1994) (“The 
Constitution expressly grants Congress, not the President, the power to ‘regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3)).  This power includes the 
imposition of sanctions or embargoes. See Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492–93 (1904) 
(“[I]t is not to be doubted that from the beginning Congress has exercised a plenary power in 
respect to the exclusion of merchandise brought from foreign countries; not alone directly by 
the enactment of embargo statutes, but indirectly as a necessary result of provisions contained 
in tariff legislation.  It has also, in other than tariff legislation, exerted a police power over 
foreign commerce by provisions which in and of themselves amounted to the assertion of the 
right to exclude merchandise at discretion.”); see also David H. Moore, Taking Cues from 
Congress:  Judicial Review, Congressional Authorization, and the Expansion of Presidential 
Power, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019, 1037–38 (2015) (“The Constitution . . . explicitly 
grants Congress the power ‘[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.’  The Supreme 
Court has described this power as ‘plenary,’ ‘complete,’ ‘exclusive and absolute,’ and has 
recognized congressional supremacy over the executive in foreign commerce.” (footnotes 
omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3)); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, 
The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 349 (2001) (“[R]egulation of 
commerce with foreign nations—including embargoes—was encompassed by Congress’s 
express Article I, Section 8 power. . . .  [T]here was no discussion of the President imposing 
an embargo (or other regulation of commerce) during the Washington Administration; these 
matters were handled in Congress.” (footnote omitted)). 
 8. Majorities in both houses eventually voted to express disapproval of the agreement. 
See Erin Kelly, Democrats Block Senate Vote to Reject Iran Nuclear Deal for Second Time, 
USA TODAY (Sept. 15, 2015) [hereinafter Kelly, Senate Vote], 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/09/15/democrats-block-senate-vote-reject-iran-
nuclear-deal-second-time/72317408/ [https://perma.cc/C6UC-DRZB] (“Senators voted 56-42 
in favor of bringing to the floor a resolution of disapproval opposing the Iran deal.”); Erin 
Kelly, House Votes to Reject Iran Nuclear Deal, But Action Has Little Impact, USA TODAY 
(Sept. 11, 2015) [hereinafter Kelly, House Vote], https://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
news/2015/09/11/house-votes-reject-iran-nuclear-deal-but-action-has-little-
impact/72061716/ [https://perma.cc/9QLY-JPB3].  For a discussion of the Iran Nuclear 
Agreement Review Act, see infra Part III.D. 
 9. See Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Sec’y, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
to Mike Pompeo, U.S. Rep. From Kan. (Nov. 19, 2015), http://pompeo.house.gov/ 
uploadedfiles/151124_-_reply_from_state_regarding_jcpoa.pdf [https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20160310175929/http://pompeo.house.gov/uploadedfiles/151124_-_reply_from_state_ 
regarding_jcpoa.pdf] (“The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not a treaty or an 
executive agreement, and is not a signed document.  The JCPOA reflects political 
commitments between Iran, the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, Russia, China), and the European Union.  As you know, the United States has a 
long-standing practice of addressing sensitive problems in negotiations that culminate in 
political commitments.”); Jen Psaki, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, State Department 
Daily Press Briefing (Mar. 10, 2015), https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/ 
2015/03/238718.htm [https://perma.cc/FZ2P-XMTN] (describing the JCPOA as involving “a 
multilateral understanding between many countries,” “political commitments,” and 
“nonbinding arrangements”). 
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stating how he will act pursuant to his constitutional or statutory authorities 
in response to the actions of other countries.10  Second, the President 
concluded he could lift the sanctions based on congressionally delegated 
authority in the existing sanctions legislation.11  As a general matter, when 
authorizing the President to impose sanctions on Iran or those doing business 
with Iran, Congress provided that the President could grant limited waivers 
in order to exempt certain persons, entities, or financial transactions from 
penalties when the national interest so required.12  To comply with the 
commitments he made in the JCPOA, however, President Obama invoked 
these waiver provisions in tandem to cease altogether enforcing sanctions 
provisions related to Iran’s nuclear program.13 
Both steps in President Obama’s reasoning are problematic.  First, it is not 
clear that the JCPOA is a nonbinding political commitment.  The text of the 
agreement provides that Iran and the other signatories “will take the 
following voluntary measures within the timeframe as detailed in this 
JCPOA,” which simultaneously describes its provisions as voluntary and 
obligatory.14  The “U.S. Administration,” meanwhile, is obliged to “refrain 
from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions . . . that it has ceased 
applying under th[e] JCPOA” and to “refrain from imposing new nuclear-
related sanctions” for the fifteen-year life of the agreement, which extends 
beyond President Obama’s tenure in office.15  So the agreement purports not 
simply to explain how the Obama administration intended to act in response 
to Iranian activities but to govern the actions of succeeding administrations—
that is, to treat President Obama’s waivers of sanctions enforcement as an 
ongoing obligation of the United States.16 
 
 10. Duncan B. Hollis & Joshua J. Newcomer, “Political” Commitments and the 
Constitution, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 507, 517 (2009); see also Anthony Aust, The Theory and 
Practice of Informal International Instruments, 35 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 787, 797, 807 (1986); 
Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 296, 302–04 (1977). 
 11. See David E. Sanger, Obama Sees an Iran Deal That Could Avoid Congress, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/us/politics/obama-sees-an-iran-
deal-that-could-avoid-congress-.html [https://perma.cc/9YUL-NP9Y] (“The Treasury 
Department, in a detailed study it declined to make public, has concluded Mr. Obama has the 
authority to suspend the vast majority of those sanctions without seeking a vote by Congress, 
officials say.”). 
 12. See infra Part III.A. 
 13. See Letter from John F. Kerry, U.S. Sec’y of State, to U.S. Congress (Oct. 18, 2015), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/248501.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM6Z-6UAM] 
(invoking four waiver provisions of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 
to lift thirteen sanctions provisions of that law, the waiver provision of the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2012 to cease the imposition of sanctions under that law, two waiver 
provisions of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 to lift two 
sanctions provisions of that law, and the waiver provision of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 to 
waive the sanctions provision of that law). 
 14. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, supra note 1, at 6. 
 15. Id. at 13. 
 16. For a discussion whether the JCPOA is indeed nonbinding, see Michael D. Ramsey, 
Evading the Treaty Power?:  The Constitutionality of Nonbinding Agreements, 11 FIU L. REV. 
371, 377–81 (2016). 
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Second, and more fundamentally, the President’s across-the-board 
exercise of waiver authority contradicts the expressed intent of Congress in 
the sanctions statutes.  Congress authorized the President to waive the 
application of sanctions penalties in individual cases.17  The limited waiver 
provisions stand in contrast to the “sunset provisions” of the same legislation, 
which allow for the wholesale cessation of sanctions only if the President 
certifies to Congress that Iran has stopped supporting terrorism and ceased 
pursuing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well as ballistic 
missile technology.18  President Obama did not make the certifications 
required for across-the-board lifting of sanctions but made use of the more 
limited waiver provisions to the same end.19 
That Congress did not intend the waiver provisions to authorize a 
comprehensive lifting of sanctions is apparent not only from the contrast 
between the waiver and sunset provisions but also from other restrictions on 
waivers in the sanctions legislation.  Under one such statute, the Iran Freedom 
and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, the President may waive the 
imposition of sanctions “for a period of not more than 180 days,” which he 
may renew “for additional periods of not more than 180 days” if he submits 
to the appropriate congressional committees a report providing a national 
security justification for the waiver.20  Accordingly, to comply with his 
commitments under the JCPOA, the President must return to Congress every 
180 days with a report justifying his decision to renew the time-limited 
waiver. 
It is difficult, as we set out in detail below, to read the sanctions legislation 
as authorizing the President to cobble together the individual waiver 
provisions throughout the statutory sanctions framework and extend 
numerous blanket waivers simultaneously in order to grant Iran systematic 
sanctions relief without having to go back to Congress.21  In doing so, the 
President did not act within the legislative framework established by 
Congress but essentially overturned that framework.22  That he did so in order 
 
 17. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note sec. 4(c)(1)(A) (2012) (“The President may, on a case by case 
basis, waive for a period of not more than six months the application of section 5(a) with 
respect to a national of a country, if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional 
committees at least 30 days before such waiver is to take effect that such waiver is vital to the 
national security interests of the United States.”); see also infra Part III.A. 
 18. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note sec. 8. 
 19. See infra notes 246, 259, 265, 283 and accompanying text. 
 20. 22 U.S.C. § 8804(g) (2012). 
 21. See infra Parts III.A, IV. 
 22. Even defenders of “big waiver”—the view that statutes may properly authorize the 
President to waive important substantive provisions—agree that any exercise of waiver 
authority must be “justified as being within the statutory enactment.” David J. Barron & Todd 
D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 332 (2013) (“[W]aiver should 
therefore have to be justified as being within the statutory enactment, as carrying forward one 
or more of what can be reasonably thought to be the purposes of the statute.”); Zachary S. 
Price, Seeking Baselines for Negative Authority:  Constitutional and Rule-of-Law Arguments 
over Nonenforcement and Waiver, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 235, 265–66 (2016) (“In allowing 
waivers, Congress presumably did not intend to authorize outright cancelation of statutory 
provisions based on mere executive disagreement with statutory requirements.”); see also 
infra Part IV. 
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to comply with a political commitment made on his own unilateral 
authority—even if to undergird an agreement with a foreign state—does not 
justify disregarding the legislative framework Congress has established. 
The President’s exercise of unilateral authority evidenced in the Iran 
nuclear agreement violates the constitutional separation of powers.  Altering 
the governing legal framework set by Congress requires an exercise of 
legislative power, and the President is not a lawmaker.23 
This point has been missed in the debate over the JCPOA and the academic 
literature on sole executive agreements.  That literature focuses almost 
exclusively on whether and under what circumstances the President must act 
pursuant to the treaty power rather than concluding agreements on his own 
authority or with congressional assent.24  Accordingly, critics of the JCPOA 
have argued that the agreement represents an evasion of the treaty power.25  
Defenders of the agreement’s legality have praised the President’s “creative 
lawyers” for effectuating “significant changes in U.S. domestic law without 
recourse to a congressional vote” by utilizing “delegated authority from 
Congress that Congress had no idea would lead to such” changes.26 
Neither side grapples with what might be termed “the Steel Seizure 
principle”—that the President lacks the authority to change enacted law 
without congressional authorization and must respect the framework 
established by Congress.  All concede that the President cannot contravene 
congressional requirements; the Steel Seizure principle extends the limit on 
presidential action to include the policies embodied in the legislated 
framework even if no express statutory prohibition is directly violated.27  The 
President acts unlawfully, even in the foreign relations area, when he acts in 
derogation of the extant legislative framework—that is, when he fails to 
follow “the plan Congress adopted” for dealing with the particular subject 
 
 23. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952) 
(“The Founders of this Nation entrusted the law making power to the Congress alone in both 
good and bad times.”). 
 24. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 175–230 (2d 
ed. 1996); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 40–45 (1990); 
Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1574–78 
(2007); Jack Goldsmith, The Contributions of the Obama Administration to the Practice and 
Theory of International Law, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 455, 464 (2016); Hollis & Newcomer, supra 
note 10, at 514–15; Ramsey, supra note 16, at 371–73; Michael D. Ramsey, Executive 
Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 134–39 (1998); Ingrid Brunk 
Wuerth, The Dangers of Deference:  International Claim Settlement by the President, 44 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 11–14 (2003). 
 25. See, e.g., David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, The Lawless Underpinnings of the Iran 
Nuclear Deal, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 26, 2015, 6:32 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-
lawless-underpinnings-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal-1437949928 [https://perma.cc/WB4U-
LAUT]; see also Ramsey, supra note 16, at 380–84. 
 26. Goldsmith, supra note 24, at 467, 473. 
 27. See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“It cannot be 
contended that the President would have had power to issue this order had Congress explicitly 
negated such authority in formal legislation.  Congress has expressed its will to withhold this 
power from the President as though it had said so in so many words.”); see also infra Part I.A. 
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matter, in the words of Justice Hugo Black’s opinion for the Court in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure).28 
This Article focuses on the Steel Seizure principle and its implications for 
the Iran nuclear agreement as well as similar actions testing the limits of 
executive authority.  Part I reviews the separation of powers jurisprudence of 
Steel Seizure and subsequent cases that affirm the President is not a lawmaker 
even in the realm of foreign affairs.  Next, Part II considers the practice of 
sole executive agreements and concludes that there is no well-established 
practice of, or basis for claiming congressional acquiescence to, the use of a 
sole executive agreement to bypass the legislated framework for dealing with 
a particular subject matter.  Part III then argues that in committing the United 
States to the JCPOA without congressional authorization, the President 
violated the Steel Seizure principle by acting in disregard of congressionally 
mandated policy.  Part IV concludes with a discussion of the separation of 
powers implications of the President’s claimed exercise of waiver authority 
in connection with the JCPOA.  Together, these Parts show that the 
President’s authority to enter into sole executive agreements or to take other 
executive action is limited by the President’s duty to honor “the will of 
Congress as expressed by a body of enactments” as he exercises the executive 
power.29 
I.  THE STEEL SEIZURE PRINCIPLE 
An essential feature of our system of separated powers is that the President 
“cannot of himself make a law.”30  The President’s lack of legislative power 
has important implications for foreign affairs.  In particular, the President 
may have authority unilaterally to set foreign policy in areas where Congress 
has not legislated, as part of the residual foreign affairs authority 
encompassed within “the executive power.”31  But where Congress has 
legislated—for example, by establishing a statutory sanctions framework for 
dealing with Iran and those with whom it does business—altering (including 
departing from) the legislative framework requires an exercise of legislative 
power, which the President lacks.32  The legislative framework encompasses 
the substantive provisions of law and excludes alternative approaches that 
were rejected by Congress or are otherwise incompatible with the policy 
choices Congress has made.  The President may not act contrary to the 
congressionally specified policy until Congress changes it. 
 
 28. 343 U.S. 579, 586 (1952).  As Justice Jackson famously put it in his concurrence, 
“[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,” and such measures are permissible only if the 
Constitution grants the President “a power at once so conclusive and preclusive” that it 
disables Congress from acting upon the subject. Id. at 637–38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 29. Id. at 604 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 303 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 7, at 234. 
 32. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 7, at 345 (“The traditional executive power over 
foreign affairs did not include a general power of legislation in support of foreign affairs 
objectives.”). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court articulated this principle most prominently in 
Steel Seizure.  In that case, President Truman did not violate any statutory 
proscription when he ordered the seizure of the steel mills to avoid a 
threatened work stoppage in the midst of the Korean War; indeed, three 
Justices believed he acted constitutionally to meet a national emergency 
before Congress was able to act.33  The President even invited Congress to 
disapprove the seizure after the fact, and it did not do so.34  But Congress 
had, before the seizure, legislated policies to address labor disputes that might 
lead to work stoppages in critical industries and to address the circumstances 
under which government seizure of private property was appropriate.  The 
problem with the President’s action was not that he violated any express 
statutory provision but that he acted in an area in which Congress had made 
“a conscious choice of policy” and imposed his own, alternative policy 
solution.35  When Congress has prescribed a particular approach to subject 
matter within its legislative authority, the President cannot follow an 
alternative approach without flouting congressional will and offending the 
separation of powers. 
A.  The Steel Seizure Case 
Before directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and to operate the 
steel mills during the Korean conflict, President Truman had unsuccessfully 
attempted to resolve the dispute between the steel companies and their 
employees over new collective bargaining agreements by referring the matter 
to the Federal Wage Stabilization Board.36  On April 4, 1952, the 
steelworkers union announced that a nationwide strike would begin at 
12:01 a.m. on April 9, 1952.37  Because steel was an essential component of 
virtually all war materials and the country was then engaged in the Korean 
War, the President concluded that “a work stoppage would immediately 
jeopardize and imperil our national defense” and that governmental operation 
of the steel mills was necessary “to assure the continued availability of steel 
 
 33. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 680 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (“[I]f the President has any 
power under the Constitution to meet a critical situation in the absence of express statutory 
authorization, there is no basis whatever for criticizing the exercise of such power in this 
case.”); id. at 703 (“In his Message to Congress immediately following the seizure, the 
President explained the necessity of his action in executing the military procurement and anti-
inflation legislative programs and expressed his desire to cooperate with any legislative 
proposals approving, regulating or rejecting the seizure of the steel mills.  Consequently, there 
is no evidence whatever of any Presidential purpose to defy Congress or act in any way 
inconsistent with the legislative will.”). 
 34. Id. at 677 (“[T]he President sent a letter to the President of the Senate in which he 
again described the purpose and need for his action and again stated his position that ‘The 
Congress can, if it wishes, reject the course of action I have followed in this matter.’  Congress 
has not so acted to this date.” (footnote omitted)).  As Steel Seizure holds, and as we argue 
below in the Iran sanctions context, the failure of Congress to disapprove executive action in 
disregard of an extant legislated framework does not provide ex post justification for the 
action. See id. at 587–89 (majority opinion); infra Part III.B. 
 35. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 36. Id. at 582–83 (majority opinion). 
 37. Id. at 583. 
1208 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
and steel products during the existing emergency.”38  He ordered the seizure 
a few hours before the strike was to begin.39  The steel companies complied 
under protest but challenged the seizure on the ground that it “was not 
authorized by an act of Congress or by any constitutional provisions.”40 
The Supreme Court agreed with the companies that “[t]he President’s 
power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or 
from the Constitution itself.”41  The Court found no statute that authorized 
the seizure expressly or by fair implication.42  Rather, Congress had 
established a framework for resolving work stoppages that excluded the 
governmental seizure of industrial facilities.43  When, in 1947, it considered 
the Labor Management Disputes Act (colloquially referred to as the Taft-
Hartley Act), Congress rejected an amendment that would have authorized 
governmental seizures in cases of national emergency so as not to undermine 
the process of collective bargaining.44  Thus, “the plan Congress adopted in 
that Act did not provide for seizure” but instead “sought to bring about 
settlements by use of the customary devices of mediation, conciliation, 
investigation by boards of inquiry, and public reports.”45  The 1947 law left 
unions “free to strike after a secret vote by employees as to whether they 
wished to accept their employers’ final settlement offer.”46 
President Truman understood that his order of seizure was not authorized 
by the Taft-Hartley Act and instead sought to justify his action on the basis 
of his commander-in-chief power and inherent executive authority.47  The 
Court held that the President lacked authority to disregard the policy 
framework Congress had established for dealing with strikes even in cases of 
 
 38. Id. at 589–91 (appendix to the majority opinion).  The appendix reproduces Executive 
Order 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (Apr. 8, 1952). 
 39. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 583 (majority opinion). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 585. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 586. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  As Justice Frankfurter noted: 
Congress in 1947 was again called upon to consider whether governmental seizure 
should be used to avoid serious industrial shutdowns.  Congress decided against 
conferring such power generally and in advance, without special Congressional 
enactment to meet each particular need.  Under the urgency of telephone and coal 
strikes in the winter of 1946, Congress addressed itself to the problems raised by 
‘national emergency’ strikes and lockouts.  The termination of wartime seizure 
powers on December 31, 1946, brought these matters to the attention of Congress 
with vivid impact.  A proposal that the President be given powers to seize plants to 
avert a shutdown where the ‘health or safety’ of the Nation was endangered, was 
thoroughly canvassed by Congress and rejected.  No room for doubt remains that 
the proponents as well as the opponents of the bill which became the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947 clearly understood that as a result of that 
legislation the only recourse for preventing a shutdown in any basic industry, after 
failure of mediation, was Congress.  Authorization for seizure as an available 
remedy for potential dangers was unequivocally put aside. 
Id. at 598–600 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). 
 46. Id. at 586 (majority opinion). 
 47. Id. at 579. 
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national emergency.48  To alter the framework Congress established for 
resolving national emergency labor disputes would require the exercise of 
legislative power.49  The President lacked authority to seize the steel mills 
even during wartime because the President is not a lawmaker.  “The 
Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the 
recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks 
bad.”50  It entrusts “the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good 
and bad times.”51  The President’s seizure of the mills—in the face of the 
congressionally established framework for resolving labor disputes—
violated this separation of powers.  The constitutional flaw was that “[t]he 
President’s order does not direct that a congressional policy be executed in a 
manner prescribed by Congress—it directs that a presidential policy be 
executed in a manner prescribed by the President.”52 
Importantly, it was not that Congress had expressly prohibited the 
President from seizing industrial property to avert a crisis.  Rather, Congress 
had by legislation set in place a particular policy—that labor disputes would 
be resolved by collective bargaining and without government seizure of 
plants—and the President sought to establish a different approach to labor 
disputes in its place.53  As Justice Felix Frankfurter emphasized, Congress 
had even addressed the issue of governmental seizure and authorized seizures 
under other circumstances.54  Where “Congress did specifically address itself 
to a problem, as Congress did to that of seizure,” Justice Frankfurter wrote, 
the President cannot implement a different solution without violating “the 
constitutional division of authority between President and Congress.”55 
For Frankfurter and other Justices in the majority, it might have been a 
different case if Congress had not already acted in this area.56  Yet when 
 
 48. Id. at 587–89. 
 49. Id. at 588–89. 
 50. Id. at 587; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST. 
COMMENT. 215, 216 (2002) (“Youngstown holds that the President, as chief executive, may 
not ‘execute’ laws of his own making . . . .  He may not enact domestic legislation unilaterally, 
by executive decree, but may only carry into effect enactments of the legislature or execute 
his own constitutional powers—which pointedly do not include any general legislative 
powers.  And this remains true even in the case of war or national emergency.”). 
 51. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 589 (majority opinion).  
 52. Id. at 588. 
 53. See id. at 657 (Burton, J., concurring) (“Collective bargaining, rather than 
governmental seizure, was to be relied upon.  Seizure was not to be resorted to without specific 
congressional authority.”). 
 54. Id. at 597–98 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Congress has frequently—at least 16 
times since 1916—specifically provided for executive seizure of production, transportation, 
communications, or storage facilities.”); see also id. at 615–19 (summarizing legislation 
authorizing seizures). 
 55. Id. at 609. 
 56. Id. at 597 (“We must therefore put to one side consideration of what powers the 
President would have had if there had been no legislation whatever bearing on the authority 
asserted by the seizure, or if the seizure had been only for a short, explicitly temporary period, 
to be terminated automatically unless Congressional approval were given.”); id. at 659 
(Burton, J., concurring) (“The foregoing circumstances distinguish this emergency from one 
in which Congress takes no action and outlines no governmental policy.  In the case before us, 
Congress authorized a procedure which the President declined to follow.”); id. at 662 (Clark, 
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Congress has “made a conscious choice of policy,”57 presidential departure 
from that policy “invade[s] the jurisdiction of Congress.”58  Such a change 
of policy “is an exercise of legislative power” and therefore such presidential 
action cannot be sustained “without reading Article II as giving the President 
not only the power to execute the laws but to make some.”59  Certainly, wrote 
Frankfurter, no one would contend that the President “would have had power 
to issue this order had Congress explicitly negated such authority in formal 
legislation.”60  By establishing a policy framework that prescribes an 
alternative course, “Congress has expressed its will to withhold this power 
from the President as though it had said so in so many words.”61 
Justice Robert Jackson underscored the point in his influential 
concurrence.  “Congress has not left seizure of private property an open field 
but has covered it by three statutory policies inconsistent with this seizure,” 
he wrote.62  “In choosing a different and inconsistent way of his own, the 
President cannot claim that it is necessitated or invited by failure of Congress 
to legislate upon the occasions, grounds and methods for seizure of industrial 
properties.”63  That meant that the decision to seize the mills did not fall into 
the “zone of twilight” in which the President and Congress enjoy concurrent 
powers and in which congressional neglect of pressing issues might “enable, 
if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.”64  
Because the President was acting in the face of Congress’s alternative 
solution to the same problem—that is, taking “measures incompatible with 
the expressed or implied will of Congress”—his power was “at its lowest 
ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers.”65  But the 
President had no power to alter the existing legislative framework.  “The 
Executive, except for recommendation and veto, has no legislative power,” 
 
J., concurring) (“[I]n the absence of such action by Congress, the President’s independent 
power to act depends upon the gravity of the situation confronting the nation.”). 
 57. Id. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 58. Id. at 660 (Burton, J., concurring) (“The controlling fact here is that Congress, within 
its constitutionally delegated power, has prescribed for the President specific procedures, 
exclusive of seizure, for his use in meeting the present type of emergency.  Congress has 
reserved to itself the right to determine where and when to authorize the seizure of property in 
meeting such an emergency.”); id. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring) (concluding that “where 
Congress has laid down specific procedures to deal with the type of crisis confronting the 
President, he must follow those procedures in meeting the crisis” and that in this case 
“Congress had prescribed methods to be followed by the President in meeting the emergency 
at hand”); id. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[N]othing can be plainer than that Congress 
made a conscious choice of policy in a field full of perplexity and peculiarly within legislative 
responsibility for choice.”). 
 59. Id. at 630, 633 (Douglas, J., concurring).  The President lacks the power to make laws. 
Id. at 632 (“The power to recommend legislation, granted to the President, serves only to 
emphasize that it is his function to recommend and that it is the function of the Congress to 
legislate.”). 
 60. Id. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 637. 
 65. Id. 
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Justice Jackson concluded.66  The attempt to address the risk of a work 
stoppage though a policy of governmental seizure “originates in the 
individual will of the President and represents an exercise of authority 
without law.”67 
B.  The Steel Seizure Principle in Foreign Affairs 
A possible objection to the application of the Steel Seizure principle to 
international agreements is to emphasize the domestic aspects of the labor 
dispute and plant seizure in Steel Seizure and to suggest that the President 
enjoys more expansive power in the foreign affairs context68—perhaps even 
extending to a kind of legislative power.69  The President has considerable 
authority to command the armed forces, to make treaties, and to speak for the 
nation in dealings with foreign states, but the Court has never recognized a 
legislative authority in the President to alter congressional policy even in the 
realm of foreign affairs.70  Steel Seizure itself involved an assertion of the 
President’s foreign affairs powers as executive and Commander in Chief 
during wartime.71  As Justice Jackson put it, “it is said he has invested himself 
with ‘war powers.’”72  The Court rejected the notion that the President’s 
power over foreign affairs allowed him to exercise legislative authority:  “He 
has no monopoly of ‘war powers,’ whatever they are,” wrote Jackson, noting 
that even in military affairs “heed has been taken of any efforts of Congress 
to negative his authority.”73 
Steel Seizure also provided the occasion to clarify the scope of presidential 
authority as enunciated in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,74 in 
which the Court suggested that the President possessed broad inherent power 
 
 66. Id. at 655. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936) 
(identifying not only “authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power” 
but also “the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of 
the federal government in the field of international relations—a power which does not require 
as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other 
governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the 
Constitution”).  But see infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s 
subsequent treatment of this language). 
 69. See HENKIN, supra note 24, at 228 (“If one accepts Presidential primacy in foreign 
affairs in relation to Congress, one might allow his agreements to prevail even in the face of 
earlier Congressional legislation.  If one grants the President some legislative authority in 
foreign affairs—as in regard to sovereign immunity—one might grant it to him in this respect 
too.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 70. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2113 (2015) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting) (“Never before has this Court accepted a President’s direct defiance of an Act 
of Congress in the field of foreign affairs.”).  For a discussion of the Zivotofsky decision, see 
infra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
 71. President Truman had determined that “a work stoppage would immediately 
jeopardize and imperil our national defense and the defense of those joined with us in resisting 
aggression.” Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 590–91 (appendix to the majority opinion). 
 72. Id. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 73. Id. at 644–45; see also id. at 645 n.14. 
 74. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
1212 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
over foreign affairs.75  Justice Jackson observed that Curtiss-Wright fell into 
his first class of cases, in which the President acted pursuant to congressional 
authorization:  the case “involved, not the question of the President’s power 
to act without congressional authority, but the question of his right to act 
under and in accord with an Act of Congress.”76  The actual holding of the 
case was that, in the area of foreign affairs, Congress could delegate authority 
to the President in broader terms than perhaps would be permissible in 
domestic affairs.77  Jackson recognized that “[i]t was intimated that the 
President might act in external affairs without congressional authority, but 
not that he might act contrary to an Act of Congress.”78  Nothing even in 
Curtiss-Wright’s dicta about the President’s inherent authority, nor anything 
in the Steel Seizure opinions, suggests that the President’s obligation to 
adhere to the legislative framework for dealing with a particular subject has 
limited application in the foreign affairs arena.79 
The Steel Seizure principle remains a vital part of the Supreme Court’s 
separation of powers jurisprudence in cases involving the foreign relations 
power of the United States.  The Court relied on the principle when it 
invalidated the President’s use of military commissions in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld.80  In that case, the Court held that, “[w]hether or not the President 
has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene 
military commissions, he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in 
proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers.”81  Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, writing for himself and for Justices David Souter, Ruth 
Bader Ginsberg, and Stephen Breyer, wrote that “the three-part scheme used 
by Justice Jackson” in his Steel Seizure concurrence was “[t]he proper 
framework for assessing whether executive actions are authorized.”82  For 
 
 75. See id. at 319–21.  But see Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional 
Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 379, 379–83 (2000). 
 76. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 77. Id. at 635 n.2 (“[Curtiss-Wright] recognized internal and external affairs as being in 
separate categories, and held that the strict limitation upon congressional delegations of power 
to the President over internal affairs does not apply with respect to delegations of power in 
external affairs.”); see also Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 327–28 (upholding a joint resolution 
of Congress against a challenge alleging “an unlawful delegation of legislative power”); id. at 
320 (“[C]ongressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and 
inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion 
and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs 
alone involved.”).  Since Curtiss-Wright, the Court has made clear that broad delegations will 
be upheld even with respect to internal affairs. See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, 
Nondelegation and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 251, 258 (2010) (“Congress 
may now delegate authority to regulate the private sector in ‘the public interest, convenience, 
or necessity’ and to be ‘generally fair and equitable.’” (footnote omitted) (first quoting Nat’l 
Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943); then quoting Yakus v. United States, 
321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944))). 
 78. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 79. See id. at 579 (majority opinion).  See generally Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304. 
 80. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).  See generally Samuel Estreicher & Diarmuid O’Scannlain, 
Hamdan’s Limits and the Military Commissions Act, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 403 (2006). 
 81. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593 n.23 (citing Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., 
concurring)). 
 82. Id. at 638 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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those Justices, it mattered that “the President has acted in a field with a history 
of congressional participation and regulation.”83  Because the Court 
concluded that the President’s system of military commissions was 
inconsistent with the military justice system Congress had created, the 
President’s power was “at its lowest ebb” because he had taken “measures 
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.”84 
The Court’s most recent reaffirmation of the Steel Seizure principle was in 
Medellin v. Texas.85  In that case, the Court concluded that a judgment of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) was not a binding rule of domestic law 
because the treaties pursuant to which the United States participates in the 
ICJ are not self-executing and therefore require implementing legislation to 
have domestic effect.86  President George W. Bush had issued a 
memorandum to the Attorney General stating that the United States would 
comply with its obligations under the ICJ judgment by having state courts 
give effect to the decision.87  The government argued that the President’s 
memorandum made the ICJ judgment binding law pursuant to the President’s 
power “to establish binding rules of decision that preempt contrary state 
law.”88  The Court rejected that argument because converting an international 
obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into a binding rule of 
domestic law would require an exercise of legislative power, which the 
President lacks.89 
According to Medellin, the Senate’s decision to ratify a non-self-executing 
treaty could not be taken to authorize the President to make the treaty’s 
obligations binding on courts as domestic law.  Rather, such congressional 
action “implicitly prohibits him from doing so” because “the implicit 
understanding of the ratifying Senate” was that the treaty would be non-self-
executing; the President’s assertion of authority to enforce the treaty as 
binding domestic law conflicted with that implicit congressional 
understanding.90  That conflict between the implicit understanding of 
Congress and the President’s attempt to alter that understanding placed the 
 
 83. Id.; see also id. at 639 (“Congress has set forth governing principles for military 
courts.”). 
 84. Id. at 638. 
 85. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 86. Id. at 528–30. 
 87. Id. at 498. 
 88. Id. at 523 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
at 5, Medellin, 552 U.S. 491 (No. 06-984)). 
 89. Id. at 525–26 (“The President has an array of political and diplomatic means available 
to enforce international obligations, but unilaterally converting a non-self-executing treaty into 
a self-executing one is not among them.  The responsibility for transforming an international 
obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress.”); id. 
at 526 (“Once a treaty is ratified without provisions clearly according it domestic effect . . . 
whether the treaty will ever have such effect is governed by the fundamental constitutional 
principle that ‘[t]he power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to execute in 
the President.’” (quoting Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591)); id. (“[T]he terms of a non-self-executing 
treaty can become domestic law only in the same way as any other law—through passage of 
legislation by both Houses of Congress, combined with either the President’s signature or a 
congressional override of a Presidential veto.”). 
 90. Id. at 527. 
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President’s action “within Justice Jackson’s third category,” where 
presidential power is at its lowest.91  As in Steel Seizure, the President had 
not violated any express statutory proscription.  But where Congress had 
acted by ratifying a non-self-executing treaty without providing 
implementing legislation, the President could not adopt an alternative 
approach for giving domestic effect to the ICJ judgment without 
congressional authorization.92 
The Steel Seizure principle that the President may not take actions 
incompatible with congressional policy was so ingrained in American 
jurisprudence that “[f]or our first 225 years, no President prevailed when 
contradicting a statute in the field of foreign affairs.”93  That streak was 
broken in 2015 with Zivotofsky v. Kerry,94 in which the Court upheld the 
President’s refusal to allow American citizens born in Jerusalem to have 
Israel listed as their birthplace on their passports—in the face of a 
congressional statute requiring exactly that.95  Zivotofsky nevertheless 
coheres with the Steel Seizure principle.96  In line with the Jackson 
concurrence, the Court accepted that “when ‘the President takes measures 
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress . . . he can rely 
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of 
Congress over the matter’” and “[t]o succeed in this third category, the 
President’s asserted power must be both ‘exclusive’ and ‘conclusive’ on the 
issue.”97  In the Court’s view, however, the Zivotofsky case involved the 
President’s power to recognize foreign states, which the Court placed in 
Justice Jackson’s category of powers “at once so conclusive and preclusive” 
as to “disabl[e] the Congress from acting upon the subject.”98 
The Zivotofsky Court’s conclusion that the President possesses an 
exclusive recognition power is debatable.99  But acknowledging such an 
exclusive executive power does not undermine the foundational Steel Seizure 
principle that the President cannot exercise legislative power and therefore 
cannot act contrary to “the expressed or implied will of Congress,”100 unless 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 530. 
 93. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2113 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 94. 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
 95. Id. at 2096 (majority opinion). 
 96. The Court explicitly noted that “[i]n considering claims of Presidential power this 
Court refers to Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite framework” from Steel Seizure. Id. at 2083. 
 97. Id. at 2084 (first alteration in original) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 98. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 637–38 (Jackson, J., concurring); see Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2087 (“The formal act of recognition is an executive power that Congress may not 
qualify.”). 
 99. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2116 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution 
contemplates that the political branches will make policy about the territorial claims of foreign 
nations the same way they make policy about other international matters:  The President will 
exercise his powers on the basis of his views, Congress its powers on the basis of its views.”). 
 100. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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he is acting in an area of exclusive executive authority.101  No one, including 
President Obama, has suggested that the subject matter of the JCPOA—the 
imposition of sanctions on Iran—is an area of exclusive executive 
authority.102  The President did not claim that Congress is “disabl[ed] . . . 
from acting upon the subject”103 and that the sanctions statutes are 
unconstitutional but rather that he acted consistent with the expressed or 
implied will of Congress embodied in those statutes. 
II.  THE PRACTICE OF SOLE EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 
The history of the President’s use of sole executive agreements is 
consistent with the Steel Seizure understanding that the President must 
respect congressional policy even in the foreign relations arena.  There is no 
basis for arguing that a history of congressional acquiescence has added a 
“historical gloss” to the foundational constitutional principle that the 
executive is not a lawmaker even when dealing with foreign relations.104 
In the founding period, it was not clear that the lead role in making treaties 
was an executive function because the binding character of such agreements 
“partake[s] more of the legislative than of the executive character.”105  
According to an early perspective, the President made treaties only as an 
agent of the Senate.106  So when the President made agreements on his own 
authority, those agreements were not understood to have the legislative 
weight of a treaty or statute or to involve the exercise of a lawmaking 
power.107  That understanding of the limited, nonlegislative effect of sole 
executive agreements has not been disturbed in subsequent practice, with one 
possible exception:  the President’s practice of utilizing executive agreements 
to settle claims of Americans against foreign governments.  Historically, 
settlement of such claims could be regarded as an executive function because 
foreign states enjoyed absolute immunity from suit, so the only way such 
claims could be vindicated was for the President to pursue the claim 
diplomatically.108  Yet even after Congress abrogated foreign sovereign 
 
 101. For the same reason, Professor Henkin is mistaken to characterize presidential 
recognition decisions—which may affect sovereign and diplomatic immunity—as exercises 
of legislative power. See HENKIN, supra note 24, at 54 (“There may be domestic legal 
consequences when the President decides to recognize or not to recognize a foreign state or 
government.”). 
 102. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 103. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 637–38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 104. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the 
Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012); Shalev Roisman, Constitutional 
Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668 (2016). 
 105. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 106. JAMES BURNHAM, CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION 202–04 (1959); HENKIN, 
supra note 24, at 177; Ramsey, supra note 16, at 371 (“[D]uring most of the Convention, the 
draft Constitution did not involve the President in treaty making at all, giving the power 
entirely to the Senate.”). 
 107. BURNHAM, supra note 106, at 202–03. 
 108. See HENKIN, supra note 24, at 41–43, 41 n.19; Clark, supra note 24, at 1626–27; 
Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-International Tribunal:  
Reclaiming the Court’s Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based Suits by 
Foreign States Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1855–58 (2004). 
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immunity in 1976, thus permitting Americans to pursue most claims against 
foreign states in American courts,109 the Supreme Court continued to 
recognize claims settlement as an executive function that did not require ex 
ante congressional authorization.110  This view, whatever its merits, does not 
contradict the applicability of the Steel Seizure principle even in the foreign 
relations area. 
A.  Claims Settlement 
The prime example of the President’s ostensible power to effect legislative 
change through sole executive action that has been cited by scholars,111 and 
arguably even by the Supreme Court,112 is the President’s “authority to 
resolve claims disputes with foreign nations.”113  It is certainly true that 
“[m]aking executive agreements to settle claims of American nationals 
against foreign governments is a particularly longstanding practice.”114  But 
the argument that this practice represents a presidential exercise of 
lawmaking power ignores the origin of the practice.  As mentioned, until 
1976, foreign states enjoyed absolute immunity from suit, and therefore the 
only way an American could vindicate a claim against a foreign state was for 
the President to espouse his claim and resolve it diplomatically.  In doing so, 
the President was not displacing legislative action or otherwise making law; 
he was occupying a diplomatic area that legislation then could not reach.  The 
Supreme Court put the point clearly in the nineteenth century: 
One nation treats with the citizens of another only through their 
government.  A sovereign cannot be sued in his own courts without his 
consent.  His own dignity, as well as the dignity of the nation he represents, 
prevents his appearance to answer a suit against him in the courts of another 
sovereignty, except in performance of his obligations, by treaty or 
otherwise, voluntarily assumed.  Hence, a citizen of one nation wronged by 
the conduct of another nation, must seek redress through his own 
government.  His sovereign must assume the responsibility of presenting 
his claim, or it need not be considered.  If this responsibility is assumed, 
the claim may be prosecuted as one nation proceeds against another, not by 
suit in the courts, as of right, but by diplomacy, or, if need be, by war.115 
 
 109. See infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 110. See infra Part II.B. 
 111. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 24, at 228 n.* (arguing that executive claims settlement 
agreements “made law”). 
 112. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531–32 (2008) (noting that “the making of executive 
agreements to settle civil claims between American citizens and foreign governments” 
emerged from a “‘longstanding practice’ of congressional acquiescence” (quoting Dames & 
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981))). 
 113. Id. at 530. 
 114. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003); see also SAMUEL B. 
CRANDALL, TREATIES:  THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 108–11 (2d ed. 1916). 
 115. United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 524 (1875); see also Steven Menashi, Article 
III as a Constitutional Compromise:  Modern Textualism and State Sovereign Immunity, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1135, 1158 (2009) (discussing the founding-era consensus that 
“immunity to suit is an inherent attribute of sovereignty”). 
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When the President backed such claims, he did not make law binding on the 
nation but acted as a representative of the country seeking to further national 
interests.  As the U.S. Court of Claims stated in an 1884 ruling, the 
government acted “not as an agent advancing private claims, but as a 
sovereign seeking satisfaction of its own demands for injuries done to its 
subjects.”116  It followed that the President could also decide that pursuing 
such claims would undermine the national interest and therefore choose not 
to espouse them. 
The presidential practice of resolving claims against foreign states can be 
said to rest on congressional acquiescence only because it was unthinkable 
until very late in American history that Congress could abrogate the 
sovereign immunity of foreign states.  Rather, when Congress took a position 
on how claims ought to be resolved, its action took the form of a request that 
the President seek a particular settlement.117  It was not that Congress 
passively accepted the President’s exercise of lawmaking power in this area 
but that Congress recognized the diplomatic pursuit of foreign claims to be a 
nonlegislative executive function.  The President could make agreements 
with foreign governments to settle such claims, but, pursuant to such a sole 
executive agreement, “no obligation, except to relinquish the claim, is 
assumed on the part of the United States.”118  And such agreements—being 
neither treaties nor statutes—did not constitute “the law of the land” and 
could not modify the operation of existing statutes.119 
The historical practice of presidential claims settlement, then, provides no 
precedent for the President’s exercise of a legislative power to displace 
 
 116. Great W. Ins. Co. v. United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 206, 218, aff’d, 112 U.S. 193 (1884). 
 117. For example, in the nineteenth-century case of Antonio Maximo Mora—a naturalized 
American citizen whose property in Cuba was confiscated by Spain for “alleged complicity in 
the Cuban rebellion,” H.R. REP. NO. 52-2573, at 1 (1893)—Congress, by resolution, 
“requested” that the President pursue the claim and keep Congress apprised of his negotiations. 
See H.R.J. Res. 30, 53d Cong. (1895) (“Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President be, and he is hereby, 
requested to insist upon the payment of the sum agreed upon between the Governments of 
Spain and the United States in liquidation of the claim of Antonio Maximo Mora against the 
Government of Spain, with interest from the time when the said amount should have been paid 
under the agreement.”); see also S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 53-10, at 1 (1894) (“In response to the 
resolution of the Senate, dated December 6, 1894, requesting that copies of correspondence in 
regard to the claim of Antonio Maximo Mora against the Government of Spain, exchanged 
since my last message to the Senate on the same subject, dated June 20, 1894, be 
communicated to it if not incompatible with the public interests, I transmit herewith the report 
of the Secretary of State on the matter, with accompanying copies of correspondence.”). 
 118. CRANDALL, supra note 114, at 108. 
 119. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Angarica de la Rua v. Bayard, 15 D.C. (4 Mackey) 310, 
320 (1885) (“[A] treaty would be the law of the land, as much as the statute to which we have 
referred.  But this agreement between the American Minister at Madrid and the Spanish 
Minister of State was not a treaty, and its terms could not modify the operation of a statute, 
even if they had been intended to do so.”), aff’d, 127 U.S. 251 (1888); see also U.S. CONST. 
art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”). 
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congressional policy.  Once Congress abrogated foreign sovereign immunity 
in 1976 and provided a legal framework for resolving such disputes, the 
President’s unilateral authority in this area necessarily became more 
constrained.120 
For these and other reasons, the leading cases decided prior to 1976 
concerning presidential claims-settlement agreements—United States v. 
Belmont121 and United States v. Pink122—are fully consistent with the Steel 
Seizure principle.  To be sure, both opinions contain broad language 
suggesting that sole executive agreements settling foreign claims have 
enough legal force to displace state law.123  But in both cases, the particular 
agreement was held to displace state law only because it was part of the 
President’s exercise of the recognition power.124  These cases involved 
recognition by the United States of a foreign state—an exercise of executive 
power that the courts were bound to accept (and which the Court later made 
clear could countermand legislation).125  At issue in both cases was President 
Roosevelt’s 1933 recognition of the Soviet Union and the accompanying 
agreement, termed the “Litvinov Assignment,” pursuant to which claims by 
the Soviet Union against Americans holding the assets of nationalized 
Russian companies would be released and assigned to the United States.126 
In Belmont, pursuant to the Litvinov Assignment, the United States sued 
August Belmont, a private banker in New York, to recover money that 
Petrograd Metal Works deposited with Belmont prior to its nationalization 
by the Soviet Union in 1918.127  Pursuant to the act-of-state doctrine, “the 
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government 
of another done within its own territory.”128  So once the United States 
recognized the Soviet Union as the legitimate government in Russia, 
 
 120. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(d)(2)(c), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–1611 (2012); see 
also Clark, supra note 24, at 1618 (arguing the historical practice provides no real support for 
a “freestanding executive power to settle legal claims by citizens with a federal statutory right 
to sue foreign states in U.S. courts”). 
 121. 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
 122. 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
 123. Id. at 230 (“A treaty is a ‘Law of the Land’ under the supremacy clause (Art. VI, Cl. 
2) of the Constitution.  Such international compacts and agreements as the Litvinov 
Assignment have a similar dignity.”); Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331 (“[T]he external powers of the 
United States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies . . . .  [W]hile this rule 
in respect of treaties is established by the express language of [Article 6, Clause 2] of the 
Constitution, the same rule would result in the case of all international compacts and 
agreements from the very fact that complete power over international affairs is in the national 
government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of 
the several states.”); see also Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 53 (1993) (“[I]n United States v. Belmont and United States v. Pink, the 
Supreme Court apparently assumed the existence of some independent presidential law-
making authority.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 124. Pink, 315 U.S. at 230; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 329–30. 
 125. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2087 (2015); see also 
Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Russia, 21 F.2d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1927) (“The courts may not 
independently make inquiry as to who should or should not be recognized.”). 
 126. See Pink, 315 U.S. at 211–13; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 326. 
 127. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 325–26. 
 128. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). 
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American courts were bound to accept the Soviet nationalization of property 
within Russian territory.129  But the Second Circuit had concluded that the 
act-of-state doctrine did not apply to property located in New York and, 
moreover, that enforcing the Soviet nationalization in New York would 
violate the state’s public policy.130  The Supreme Court reversed.131  The 
Court broadly stated that “no state policy can prevail against the international 
compact here involved,” suggesting that the Litvinov Assignment—entered 
into by the President without congressional authorization—could preempt 
state law.132  But the Court immediately proceeded to a discussion of the act-
of-state doctrine and the principle that the President’s recognition decision is 
binding on the courts.133  The Court explained: 
We take judicial notice of the fact that coincident with the assignment set 
forth in the complaint, the President recognized the Soviet Government, 
and normal diplomatic relations were established between that government 
and the Government of the United States, followed by an exchange of 
ambassadors.  The effect of this was to validate, so far as this country is 
concerned, all acts of the Soviet Government here involved from the 
commencement of its existence.134 
In the Belmont Court’s view, the Second Circuit’s decision failed to respect 
the Soviet government’s nationalization of Russian corporations.135  The 
situs of the deposit did not alter the effect of the act-of-state doctrine in this 
case.  The doctrine bound the courts to recognize “the Soviet Government as 
the successor to the [nationalized] corporation” and therefore holding “[t]he 
substantive right to the moneys,” which it “has passed to the United States” 
via the Litvinov Assignment.136  President Roosevelt’s compact with the 
Soviet Union did not establish law displacing state public policy.  Rather, it 
was the recognition of the Soviet Union that required the courts to respect the 
Soviet nationalization.137  In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan Stone—
 
 129. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) (“The act 
of state doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of this country from 
inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed 
within its own territory.”). 
 130. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 327 (discussing the lower court ruling). 
 131. Id. at 333. 
 132. Id. at 327. 
 133. Id. at 328 (“This court held that the conduct of foreign relations was committed by the 
Constitution to the political departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be 
done in the exercise of this political power was not subject to judicial inquiry or decision; that 
who is the sovereign of a territory is not a judicial question, but one the determination of which 
by the political departments conclusively binds the courts; and that recognition by these 
departments is retroactive and validates all actions and conduct of the government so 
recognized from the commencement of its existence.”). 
 134. Id. at 330. 
 135. Id. at 332 (“What another country has done in the way of taking over property of its 
nationals, and especially of its corporations, is not a matter for judicial consideration here.  
Such nationals must look to their own government for any redress to which they may be 
entitled.”). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 330 (“The recognition, establishment of diplomatic relations, the assignment, 
and agreements with respect thereto, were all parts of one transaction, resulting in an 
international compact between the two governments.”). 
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joined by Justices Louis Brandeis and Benjamin Cardozo—emphasized that 
the President’s recognition decision both resolved the case and obviated any 
conflict with New York’s public policy.138 
The Court’s decision in Pink confirms that the President’s recognition of 
the Soviet Union, which triggered the act-of-state doctrine, was responsible 
for the outcome in both cases.  Pink involved an action by the United States 
to recover the assets of the New York branch of the First Russian Insurance 
Company, about a million dollars of which remained in the custody of New 
York’s Superintendent of Insurance after the company’s domestic creditors 
had been paid.139  The New York Court of Appeals—like the Second Circuit 
in Belmont—declined to hold that assets located in New York were owed to 
the Soviet government by virtue of the nationalization of the company.140  
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “[t]he action of New York in this 
case amounts in substance to a rejection of a part of the policy underlying 
recognition by this nation of Soviet Russia.  Such power is not accorded a 
State in our constitutional system.”141 
Again, the Court included some language suggesting that the Litvinov 
Assignment had some legal force of its own, but this was only because 
“[r]ecognition and the Litvinov Assignment were interdependent.”142  The 
Court said that it “would usurp the executive function if we held that that 
decision was not final and conclusive in the courts”—that is, “the power of 
recognition might be thwarted or seriously diluted.”143  In Belmont and Pink, 
then, it was not that an executive agreement with the Soviet Union could 
make law displacing state law but that the state could not take actions 
 
 138. Id. at 334 (Stone, J., concurring) (“It does not appear that the state of New York, at 
least since our diplomatic recognition of the Soviet government, has any policy which would 
permit a New York debtor to question the title of that government to a claim of the creditor 
acquired by its confiscatory decree, and no reason is apparent for assuming that such is its 
policy.”).  Justice Stone also criticized the majority for its language regarding the preemptive 
effect of the compact. See id. at 336 (“It is unnecessary to consider whether the present 
agreement between the two governments can rightly be given the same effect as a treaty . . . 
for neither the allegations of the bill of complaint, nor the diplomatic exchanges, suggest that 
the United States has either recognized or declared that any state policy is to be overridden.”). 
 139. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 210–11 (1942); see also People v. Russian 
Reinsurance Co., 175 N.E. 114, 115 (N.Y. 1931). 
 140. United States v. Pink, 32 N.E.2d 552, 552 (N.Y. 1940) (per curiam) (citing Moscow 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of N.Y. & Tr. Co., 20 N.E.2d 758 (N.Y. 1939)); see also Moscow Fire, 
20 N.E.2d at 766 (holding that the Soviet government “had no power of control” over property 
that “at all times has been within the State of New York,” meaning “its situs was in this State”); 
id. at 769 (“The courts below have made the proper choice, not because enforcement of 
confiscatory decrees of property situated elsewhere is contrary to our public policy, but 
because under the law of this State such confiscatory decrees do not affect the property claimed 
here.”). 
 141. Pink, 315 U.S. at 233.  The Court noted that “[t]hat power was denied New York in 
United States v. Belmont” and “the Belmont case is determinative of the present controversy.” 
Id. at 222.  Belmont determined the outcome “[w]ith one qualification,” namely whether “the 
stake of the foreign creditors in this liquidation proceeding and the provision which New York 
has provided for their protection call for a different result.” Id. at 222, 226.  The Court 
concluded that those factors did not dictate a different result. See id. at 226–30. 
 142. Id. at 230. 
 143. Id. 
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contrary to the “underlying policy adopted by the United States when it 
recognized the Soviet Government.”144  As the Court stated in Zivotofsky, 
“[l]egal consequences follow formal recognition” because, among other 
things, “[t]he actions of a recognized sovereign committed within its own 
territory . . . receive deference in domestic courts under the act of state 
doctrine.”145  The Belmont and Pink decisions are forerunners of Zivotofsky 
in recognizing legal consequences to the President’s recognition decisions.  
Neither case provides convincing support for the notion that the President’s 
unilateral signing of an international agreement itself is an exercise of 
legislative authority capable of altering an extant legislative framework. 
B.  Dames & Moore and Garamendi 
In two cases that followed Congress’s abrogation of foreign sovereign 
immunity in 1976—Dames & Moore v. Regan146 and American Insurance 
Ass’n v. Garamendi147—the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the President has 
the power to extinguish state law claims via executive agreement.148  These 
decisions have attracted substantial criticism.149  In both cases, the Court 
relied on an apparent history of congressional approval of executive claims 
settlement.  In Dames & Moore, the Court said that the President’s settlement 
of claims by executive agreement reflects “a systematic, unbroken, executive 
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before 
questioned”150 so as to “raise a presumption that the [action] had been [taken] 
in pursuance of [Congress’s] consent.”151  In Garamendi, the Court noted 
“the practice goes back over 200 years, and has received congressional 
acquiescence throughout its history.”152  In both cases, the Court determined 
that the executive agreements did not contravene congressional policy,153 and 
therefore the Court was free to conclude that the President’s actions were 
 
 144. Id. at 232. 
 145. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015).  The act-of-state 
doctrine follows from the constitutional separation of powers. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (“The act of state doctrine does . . . have ‘constitutional’ 
underpinnings.  It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a 
system of separation of powers.”); see also W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 
493 U.S. 400, 404 (1990) (describing the act-of-state doctrine “as a consequence of domestic 
separation of powers, reflecting ‘the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement 
in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder’ the conduct of foreign 
affairs” (quoting Banco Nacional, 376 U.S. at 423)). 
 146. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 147. 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
 148. Id. at 415; Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 682–83. 
 149. See, e.g., KOH, supra note 24, at 138–40 (criticizing Dames & Moore); Brannon P. 
Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and Executive 
Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 925–42 (2004). 
 150. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 
(Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 151. Id. (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915)). 
 152. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415. 
 153. See id. at 427 (finding no “tension between an Act of Congress and Presidential 
foreign policy”); Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 687–88. 
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consistent with the Steel Seizure principle.154  The Court has recently 
clarified that any implicit congressional approval of executive agreements 
extends no further than the specific context of claims settlement.155  Still, 
these cases might be taken to authorize presidential lawmaking by executive 
agreement, so it is important to emphasize the limited scope of their holdings. 
1.  Dames & Moore 
In Dames & Moore, the Court upheld the Algiers Accords, a sole executive 
agreement that aimed to resolve the Iranian hostage crisis.156  Pursuant to the 
Accords, President Carter nullified judicial attachments of Iranian assets in 
this country and ordered the transfer of frozen Iranian assets.157  The Accords 
also called for the establishment of an Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 
and President Reagan (upon ratifying and adopting President Carter’s 
executive orders) “‘suspended’ all ‘claims which may be presented to 
the . . . Tribunal’ and provided that such claims ‘shall have no legal effect in 
any action now pending in any court of the United States.’”158  Dames & 
Moore, a company with pending claims against Iran, sought to prevent 
enforcement of the executive actions implementing the Algiers Accords.159 
The Court held in Dames & Moore that there was “specific congressional 
authorization to the President to nullify the attachments and order the transfer 
of Iranian assets”160 pursuant to provisions of the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).161  There was not, however, specific 
statutory authorization to suspend claims.162  The Court nevertheless upheld 
the suspension for several reasons.  First, the Court explained, the enactment 
of related legislation that “evinces legislative intent to accord the President 
broad discretion” may be considered to “‘invite’ ‘measures on independent 
presidential responsibility,’” at least “where there is no contrary indication of 
legislative intent and when, as here, there is a history of congressional 
acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the President.”163  Second, 
the Court explained that “[c]rucial to our decision today is the conclusion that 
Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by 
 
 154. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 429; Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686 (applying Steel 
Seizure to presidential suspension of claims). 
 155. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531 (2008); see infra notes 186–188 and 
accompanying text. 
 156. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 687–88; see also Declaration of the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Relating to Commitments Made by Iran and the 
United States, U.S.-Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 224.  
 157. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 665–66 (citing executive orders). 
 158. Id. at 666 (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (Feb. 24, 1981)). 
 159. Id. at 666–67. 
 160. Id. at 675. 
 161. Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. II, 91 Stat. 1625, 1626 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707 (2012)). 
 162. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 677 (“[N]either the IEEPA nor the Hostage Act 
constitutes specific authorization of the President’s action suspending claims.”). 
 163. Id. at 678–79 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 
U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
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executive agreement.”164  That implicit approval followed from historical 
practice as well as statutory law, such as the International Claims Settlement 
Act of 1949, that facilitated presidential claims settlement.165  Third, the 
Court referred to prior decisions, such as Pink, that “recognized that the 
President does have some measure of power to enter into executive 
agreements without obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate.”166  
Fourth, Congress had not disapproved of the President’s actions.167  For that 
reason, the Court was “clearly not confronted with a situation in which 
Congress has in some way resisted the exercise of Presidential authority.”168 
The Dames & Moore Court upheld presidential claims settlement authority 
even though the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 
in 1976 removed one of the reasons previously given for treating claims 
settlement as a political function to be performed by the President.  
According to the Court, the FSIA was “designed to remove one particular 
barrier to suit, namely sovereign immunity, and cannot be fairly read as 
prohibiting the President from settling claims of United States nationals 
against foreign governments.”169  The Court also pointed to post-FSIA 
legislation that assumed that the President would continue to exercise claims 
settlement authority.170  The Court concluded that 
where, as here, the settlement of claims has been determined to be a 
necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute 
between our country and another, and where, as here, we can conclude that 
Congress acquiesced in the President’s action, we are not prepared to say 
that the President lacks the power to settle such claims.171 
The Court’s opinion repeatedly and emphatically emphasizes the narrowness 
of its decision,172 the apparent congressional approval of the President’s 
 
 164. Id. at 680. 
 165. Id. (“By creating a procedure to implement future settlement agreements, Congress 
placed its stamp of approval on such agreements.”). 
 166. Id. at 682.  But see id. at 683 (“The constitutional power of the President extends to 
the settlement of mutual claims between a foreign government and the United States, at least 
when it is an incident to the recognition of that government.” (emphasis added) (quoting 
Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1951))). 
 167. Id. at 687 (“Though Congress has held hearings on the Iranian Agreement itself, 
Congress has not enacted legislation, or even passed a resolution, indicating its displeasure 
with the Agreement.  Quite the contrary.” (footnote omitted)). 
 168. Id. at 688. 
 169. Id. at 685.  This seems to sidestep the point that once Americans could bring claims 
in court, and did not need to rely on executive grace to vindicate their claims, the President 
required some measure of legislative power to alter or extinguish those claims. 
 170. Id. at 685–86 (“[T]he Congress which enacted the FSIA considered but rejected 
several proposals designed to limit the power of the President to enter into executive 
agreements, including claims settlement agreements. . . .  [J]ust one year after enacting the 
FSIA, Congress enacted the IEEPA, where the legislative history stressed that nothing in the 
IEEPA was to impede the settlement of claims of United States citizens.” (footnote omitted)). 
 171. Id. at 688. 
 172. See id. at 661 (“We attempt to lay down no general ‘guidelines’ covering other 
situations not involved here, and attempt to confine the opinion only to the very questions 
necessary to decision of the case.”); id. at 688 (“We do not decide that the President possesses 
plenary power to settle claims, even as against foreign governmental entities.”); see also KOH, 
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action, and its understanding that the Algiers Accords did not contravene 
congressional policy.173 
2.  Garamendi 
Garamendi involved a challenge by insurance companies to California’s 
Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 (HVIRA), which required all 
insurers doing business in California to disclose information about policies 
the insurers sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945.174  The aim of the 
HVIRA was to facilitate claims related to policies that were confiscated 
during the Nazi period.175  The President, however, had signed the German 
Foundation Agreement, an agreement with Germany whereby Germany 
agreed to establish a fund to compensate those “who suffered at the hands of 
German companies during the National Socialist era.”176  In return, the 
United States agreed that it would submit a statement to American courts 
entertaining such claims that “it would be in the foreign policy interests of 
the United States for the Foundation to be the exclusive forum and remedy 
for the resolution of all asserted claims against German companies arising 
from their involvement in the National Socialist era.”177 
The Garamendi Court held that the policy of the executive branch 
embodied in the German Foundation Agreement served to preempt the 
HVIRA.178  The Court noted that its “cases have recognized that the President 
has authority to make ‘executive agreements’ with other countries, requiring 
no ratification by the Senate or approval by Congress” and that “[m]aking 
executive agreements to settle claims of American nationals against foreign 
governments is a particularly longstanding practice” that “has received 
 
supra note 24, at 140 (identifying “the narrow reading originally intended” in Dames & 
Moore). 
 173. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 682 n.10 (“Congress, though legislating in the area, 
has left ‘untouched’ the authority of the President to enter into settlement agreements.”); id. at 
685 (“The President has exercised the power, acquiesced in by Congress, to settle claims.”); 
id. at 686 (“In light of the fact that Congress may be considered to have consented to the 
President’s action in suspending claims, we cannot say that action exceeded the President’s 
powers.”). 
 174. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 409 (2003). 
 175. Id. at 410–11. 
 176. Id. at 405 (quoting Agreement Concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, 
Responsibility and the Future,” Ger.-U.S., annex A, at 1, July 17, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13,104). 
 177. Id. at 406 (quoting Agreement Concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, 
Responsibility and the Future,” supra note 176, annex B, at 1).  The United States was 
“unwilling to guarantee that its foreign policy interests would ‘in themselves provide an 
independent legal basis for dismissal,’” though “the Government agreed to tell courts ‘that 
U.S. policy interests favor dismissal on any valid legal ground.’” Id. (quoting Agreement 
Concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future,” supra note 176, 
annex B, at 3). 
 178. See id. at 413 (“The principal argument for preemption made by petitioners and the 
United States as amicus curiae is that HVIRA interferes with foreign policy of the Executive 
Branch, as expressed principally in the executive agreements with Germany, Austria, and 
France.”). 
2017] TAKING STEEL SEIZURE SERIOUSLY 1225 
congressional acquiescence throughout its history.”179  The Court concluded 
that it did not matter that the claims at issue were against foreign corporations 
rather than governments because it was difficult to distinguish the actions of 
each (at least during wartime) and that insisting on such a distinction would 
undermine the President’s ability to settle international controversies.180  
Because the President had the constitutional authority to set policy regarding 
such claims, and state law conflicted with the President’s policy, the Court 
held that state law must yield.181  The Court emphasized that “Congress has 
done nothing to express disapproval of the President’s policy” and that 
“Congress has not acted on the matter addressed here.”182 
The Garamendi Court may have been on solid ground in holding that 
where Congress has not legislated in an area of foreign relations, the 
President has some latitude to pursue his own policy in that area.  However, 
the conclusion that the President’s policy preempted state law is more 
doubtful—both because the German Foundation Agreement did not purport 
to preempt state law183 and on the ground that the Court never explains how 
unilateral executive policy can become “the supreme Law of the Land” with 
the power to displace state law.184 
Perhaps aware of the difficulties underlying Garamendi, the Court’s most 
recent pronouncement on the issue has been to emphasize that Dames & 
Moore and Garamendi depend on a notion of congressional consent and that 
the President’s authority to preempt state law without congressional 
 
 179. Id. at 415 (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679–80, 682–83 (1981); 
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 223, 230, 240 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 
324, 330–31 (1937)). 
 180. Id. at 416 (“[U]ntangling government policy from private initiative during wartime is 
often so hard that diplomatic action settling claims against private parties may well be just as 
essential in the aftermath of hostilities as diplomacy to settle claims against foreign 
governments.  While a sharp line between public and private acts works for many purposes in 
the domestic law, insisting on the same line in defining the legitimate scope of the Executive’s 
international negotiations would hamstring the President in settling international 
controversies.”). 
 181. Id. at 421 (“The exercise of the federal executive authority means that state law must 
give way where, as here, there is evidence of clear conflict between the policies adopted by 
the two.”); id. at 421–23 (“[T]he national position, expressed unmistakably in the executive 
agreements signed by the President with Germany and Austria, has been to encourage 
European insurers . . . to develop acceptable claim procedures, including procedures 
governing disclosure of policy information. . . .  California has taken a different tack of 
providing regulatory sanctions to compel disclosure and payment, supplemented by a new 
cause of action for Holocaust survivors if the other sanctions should fail.”); id. at 425 
(“HVIRA is an obstacle to the success of the National Government’s chosen ‘calibration of 
force’ in dealing with the Europeans using a voluntary approach.” (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l 
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 380 (2000)); id. at 427 (“The basic fact is that California 
seeks to use an iron fist where the President has consistently chosen kid gloves.”). 
 182. Id. at 429. 
 183. See id. at 430 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Although the federal approach differs from 
California’s, no executive agreement or other formal expression of foreign policy disapproves 
state disclosure laws like the HVIRA.”); see also supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 184. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  Some such mechanism would seem to be necessary once 
sovereign immunity no longer bars judicial cognizance of most claims against foreign states. 
See supra Part II.A. 
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authorization does not extend beyond the narrow area of foreign claims 
settlement.185 
In Medellin, the Court emphasized that the President’s memorandum 
directing state courts to comply with the ICJ judgment was “not supported 
by a ‘particularly longstanding practice’ of congressional acquiescence.”186  
Rather, any such practice was limited to the foreign claims settlement 
context—“a narrow set of circumstances:  the making of executive 
agreements to settle civil claims between American citizens and foreign 
governments or foreign nationals.”187  Even though in Medellin President 
Bush had acted to accomplish “the resolution of a major foreign policy 
dispute,”188 he lacked the authority to issue binding directives to the states 
when not acting pursuant to legislation. 
In sum, the Garamendi line of cases suggests that the President can enter 
into agreements to settle claims against foreign states and foreign nationals, 
perhaps displacing state law, provided that the President is not contravening 
congressional will.  Though the cases somewhat elevate the President at the 
expense of Congress by recognizing independent authority to act in advance 
of legislative authorization in this area,189 the Court has never held that the 
President’s authority is exclusive or that he may act in disregard of 
congressional policy, even with respect to foreign claims settlement.  To the 
contrary, as Medellin illustrates, the Steel Seizure requirement that the 
President must respect congressional policy judgments continues in full 
force.190 
C.  Other Practices 
Other contexts in which the President has employed sole executive 
agreements demonstrate that unless the President acts within an area of 
exclusive presidential responsibility, such agreements cannot contravene 
congressional policy.  The President has reached agreements with foreign 
countries based on his authority to direct the armed forces, for example, or 
 
 185. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531–32 (2008). 
 186. Id. at 532 (quoting Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415).  
 187. Id. at 531. 
 188. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 438 (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 
(1981)); see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15, 
Medellin, 552 U.S. 491 (No. 06-984), 2007 WL 1909462, at *15 (“The President’s 
determination pursuant to the Optional Protocol and U.N. Charter is an exercise of this dispute-
resolution power.  The President’s determination to accept and implement the ICJ’s decision 
resolves the dispute between the United States and Mexico over the ability of 51 individuals 
to secure review and reconsideration of their convictions and sentences.  In crucial respects, 
the President exercises a more modest power in implementing the Avena decision than in 
entering into claims settlement agreements in other contexts.”). 
 189. See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 149, at 937. 
 190. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 531–32 (“[T]he limitations on this source of executive 
power are clearly set forth and the Court has been careful to note that ‘[p]ast practice does not, 
by itself, create power.’” (quoting Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686)); Dames & Moore, 453 
U.S. at 688 (“We do not decide that the President possesses plenary power to settle claims, 
even as against foreign governmental entities.”). 
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the recognition power.191  Other examples involve temporary measures, such 
as agreements that serve as a basis of negotiations192 or agreements “to afford 
a modus vivendi pending the ratification of a treaty.”193  In a revealing 
instance, when it became clear to President Theodore Roosevelt in 1906 that 
the Senate would not ratify a treaty pursuant to which the United States would 
take over customs houses in the Dominican Republic, he executed the 
protocol as an executive agreement “pending the action of the United States 
Senate upon the treaty.”194  His action sparked a significant constitutional 
debate.195  Notably, even when the President was attempting to assert 
unilateral presidential authority, he formally took the action as a temporary 
measure in anticipation of congressional authorization—and that step was 
controversial. 
There is, in our view, no basis for maintaining that a pattern of 
congressional acquiescence has created a historical gloss on the Constitution 
conferring authority on the President—by political agreement with foreign 
states or other unilateral executive action—to disregard congressional policy, 
whether in the foreign claims settlement arena or another foreign relations 
context.196  We turn now to the question whether the President’s action in 
 
 191. CRANDALL, supra note 114, at 102–08; see also EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT’S 
CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 116 (1917) (explaining that sole executive agreements “fall 
into two main orders:  first, those of which the initiating force is the power of Congress; 
second, those which the President may make in virtue either of his diplomatic powers or of his 
powers as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy”). 
 192. CRANDALL, supra note 114, at 111–12. 
 193. Id. at 112.  See generally WALLACE MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE 
AGREEMENTS:  DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
(1941) (arguing for the President’s power to enter into executive agreements and identifying 
historical precedents). 
 194. HENKIN, supra note 24, at 497 n.164 (quoting 1905 PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 360 (1906)); see also CORWIN, supra note 191, at 121. 
 195. See, e.g., 40 CONG. REC. 2125–48 (1906); 40 CONG. REC. 433–36 (1905). 
 196. A preliminary draft of the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States states that “the President has the authority to act on behalf of the United States 
in suspending or terminating U.S. treaty commitments and in withdrawing the United States 
from treaties.” RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:  
TREATIES § 113(1) (AM. LAW. INST., Council Draft No. 2, 2016).  The comments and reporters’ 
notes provide no authority for this proposition.  The Restatement draft is likely based on an 
overreading of Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).  In that case, members of Congress 
sued to block President Carter’s announcement that he would recognize the People’s Republic 
as the sole legitimate government of China and that he planned to terminate the mutual defense 
treaty with Taiwan. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997–98 (Powell, J., concurring).  The district court 
ruled that the termination would be ineffective without the consent of two-thirds of the Senate 
or approving legislation, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 
949, 965 (D.D.C.), rev’d, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).  The 
Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded with directions to dismiss. Goldwater, 
444 U.S. at 996.  Four Justices concurred in the dismissal on the ground that the action 
involved a nonjusticiable political question. See id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).  Justice 
Lewis Powell concurred on ripeness grounds. See id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring).  Justice 
William Brennan would have affirmed the judgment “insofar as it rests upon the President’s 
well-established authority to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign 
governments.” Id. at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  As Justice Brennan explained, 
termination of the treaty with Taiwan necessarily followed from the President’s recognition of 
the People’s Republic. Id. at 1007 (“Abrogation of the defense treaty with Taiwan was a 
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lifting sanctions against Iran pursuant to the JCPOA contravenes 
congressional policy or is consistent with the Steel Seizure principle. 
III.  THE IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT 
AND CONGRESSIONAL POLICY 
The President’s unilateral implementation of the JCPOA entailed the 
unraveling by sole executive action of congressionally specified policy with 
respect to sanctions against Iran.  Whatever the merits of the Court’s decision 
in Garamendi, that decision did not confront any “tension between an Act of 
Congress and Presidential foreign policy” because, as the Court put it, 
“Congress has done nothing to express disapproval of the President’s policy” 
and “has not acted on the matter addressed here.”197  By contrast, it cannot 
be gainsaid that Congress acted on the matter of Iranian sanctions and 
specifically prescribed the application of sanctions as the policy framework 
for addressing the Iranian nuclear program.198  The JCPOA not only ignored 
but effectively ended that framework.199  The result was that valid and 
applicable laws called for sanctioning entities that engage in certain 
transactions with Iran, but the United States no longer enforced those laws 
because of commitments President Obama made in the JCPOA.200 
To be sure, some of the sanctions laws leave the decision whether to apply 
sanctions to the President’s discretion.  The IEEPA and its companion statute, 
 
necessary incident to Executive recognition of the Peking Government, because the defense 
treaty was predicated upon the now-abandoned view that the Taiwan Government was the 
only legitimate political authority in China.  Our cases firmly establish that the Constitution 
commits to the President alone the power to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign 
regimes.”). 
The scope of the President’s power to terminate or to withdraw from Senate-approved 
treaties remains unsettled.  According to one view, such a power must involve law execution 
rather than lawmaking; Prakash and Ramsey emphasize that “treaties may be terminated by 
their own terms” or “by the occurrence of certain events.” Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 7, 
at 264–65.  When a President makes the requisite determinations and terminates a treaty “in 
accordance with its express terms or with international law,” he is executing rather than 
making law. Id. at 265.  Other scholars have emphasized that any presidential power to 
terminate treaties would not entail the authority to alter domestic law. See HENKIN, supra note 
24, at 54 (“No one has suggested that under the President’s ‘plenary’ foreign affairs powers 
he can, by executive act or order, enact law directly regulating persons or property in the 
United States.”); John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking:  A Textual and Structural 
Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2235 n.56 (1999) (“[N]one of these 
theories recognize an executive authority to legislate upon the legal rights and duties of 
American citizens.”). 
 197. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 427–29 (2003). 
 198. See infra Part III.A. 
 199. See infra Part III.B. 
 200. In the JCPOA, President Obama agreed to end enforcement of “all nuclear-related 
sanctions” that are “directed towards non-U.S. persons.” Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 
supra note 1, annex II, at 8 & n.6.  That is, the JCPOA applied to those sanctions related to 
Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons.  The President did not end enforcement of other sanctions 
related to Iranian support for terrorism or violations of human rights.  The following discussion 
focuses on the nuclear-related sanctions laws that were waived pursuant to the JCPOA. See 
infra Parts III.A–B.  For an overview of all sanctions statutes applicable to Iran, including 
those that were not waived, see generally KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS (2016). 
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the National Emergencies Act,201 provide substantial authority to impose 
sanctions to address international threats,202 and Presidents have exercised 
these authorities to sanction Iran.203  But Congress did not leave Iran 
sanctions policy entirely to presidential discretion.  It prescribed not only that 
the President “may” apply certain sanctions policies but also that the 
President “shall” impose a range of sanctions on specified entities.204  In 
doing so, “Congress made a conscious choice of policy”205 for addressing the 
Iranian nuclear program via economic sanctions.  As one federal appeals 
court has concluded, “Far from sitting by as successive Presidents maintained 
a sweeping sanctions regime, Congress has expanded, deepened and 
formalized the sanctions in a comprehensive legislative effort to target Iran 
through economic measures.”206 
This is, in short, not an area of congressional inaction or acquiescence but 
one in which Congress prescribed a comprehensive legislative solution.  The 
President’s reliance on a sole executive agreement essentially to reject 
Congress’s solution—indeed, to decline to enforce applicable law—renders 
the President’s exercise of authority pursuant to the JCPOA a violation of the 
Steel Seizure principle. 
A.  The Legislative Sanctions Regime 
Sanctions have been part of American policy toward Iran since the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979.207  In the 1980s and 1990s, sanctions policy largely 
focused on limiting Iranian strategic influence in the Middle East and its 
support for terrorism.208  Since the mid-2000s, sanctions policy has been 
 
 201. Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–
1651 (2012)). 
 202. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(A) (2012) (providing that the President may “investigate, 
regulate, or prohibit” any transactions in foreign exchange, any transfers between banking 
institutions that involve foreign interests, and any importing or exporting of currency or 
securities “by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States”); id. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (providing that the President may “investigate, block 
during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or 
prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, 
importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with 
respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national 
thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States”). 
 203. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,606, 77 Fed. Reg. 24,571 (Apr. 22, 2012); Exec. Order 
No. 13,382, 70 Fed. Reg. 38,567 (June 28, 2005); Exec. Order No. 13,059, 62 Fed. Reg. 44,531 
(Aug. 19, 1997).  No one doubts that the President may revoke prior executive orders. See 
Exec. Order No. 13,716, 81 Fed. Reg. 3693 (Jan. 16, 2016) (revoking prior executive orders). 
 204. See infra Part III.A. 
 205. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 602 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 206. United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 579 (3d Cir. 2011).  The court was 
addressing a defendant’s argument that the sanctions regime “violated fundamental 
separation-of-powers precepts” because Congress had neglected its “responsibility to monitor 
the implementation of the Iranian sanctions regime” and thereby “allowed the President to 
arrogate ‘virtually unlimited power over foreign trade.’” Id. at 577. 
 207. See KATZMAN, supra note 200, at 1. 
 208. Id. 
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aimed at thwarting the further development of Iran’s nuclear weapons 
program, and the American effort has become the focal point of international 
cooperation toward that goal.209  Beginning in 2006, the United States 
deployed sanctions to limit the ability of Iran to transact with non-U.S. 
counterparties through the international financial system.210  This strategy 
involved the imposition of secondary sanctions, which prohibited U.S. 
entities from transacting with non-U.S. entities that engaged in certain 
transactions with Iran.211  The goal was to pressure Iran by denying it access 
to international markets.212  When he signed the JCPOA, President Obama 
committed to suspend, if not effectively to terminate, this nuclear-related 
sanctions regime,213 so it is worth outlining the relevant congressional 
legislation establishing the regime. 
1.  Iran Sanctions Act 
In 1996, Congress adopted the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA or ILSA)214 to deny 
Iran financial resources by targeting its energy sector.  The Act was an 
attempt to apply secondary sanctions against Iran by authorizing U.S. 
penalties against third-country firms.215  In particular, section 5(a) of the Act, 
which was codified as a statutory note to 50 U.S.C. § 1701, provides that “the 
President shall impose” five or more specified financial penalties216 on any 
entity that makes an investment of $20 million or more which “directly and 
significantly contributes to the enhancement of Iran’s ability to develop 
petroleum resources.”217  With the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 26–28. 
 211. Id. at 28–29. 
 212. Id. at 28. 
 213. See generally Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, supra note 1. 
 214. Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 
note (2012) (Iran Sanctions)).  Originally named the “Iran and Libya Sanctions Act,” the law 
was retitled after it terminated with respect to Libya in 2006. Iran Freedom Support Act, Pub. 
L. No. 109-293, § 205(g), 120 Stat. 1344, 1347 (2006) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1701 note sec. 205(g) (2012) (Iran Sanctions)). 
 215. See KATZMAN, supra note 200, at 10. 
 216. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note sec. 5(a)(1)(A) (Supp. II 2015) (Iran Sanctions).  Originally, 
the Act required three or more penalties, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note sec. 5(a)(1)(A) (2012) (Iran 
Sanctions), but Congress later raised that number to five, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note sec. 5(a)(1)(A) 
(Supp. II 2015) (Iran Sanctions).  As amended, the Act provides for penalties including a 
prohibition on Export-Import Bank assistance for exports to sanctioned persons; a prohibition 
on export licenses to a sanctioned person; a prohibition on loans from U.S. financial 
institutions; a prohibition on designating a sanctioned financial institution as a primary dealer 
in U.S. Government debt instruments; a prohibition on allowing a sanctioned financial 
institution to serve as a repository of U.S. Government funds; a prohibition on U.S. 
Government procurement of goods or services from a sanctioned person; a prohibition on 
foreign-exchange transactions in which the sanctioned person has an interest; a prohibition on 
transactions between financial institutions in which the sanctioned person has an interest; a 
prohibition on property transactions in which the sanctioned person has an interest; a 
prohibition on investments in the equity of a sanctioned person, the denial of visas or expulsion 
of any corporate officer or controlling shareholder of a sanctioned person; and the imposition 
of any of these sanctions on the principal executive officers of a sanctioned person. Id. § 1701 
note sec. 6(a).  
 217. Id. § 1701 note sec. 5(a)(1). 
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Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA),218 Congress 
amended section 5(a) to impose the same requirement with respect to any 
entity that (1) provides Iran with “goods, services, technology, information, 
or support that could directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or 
expansion of Iran’s domestic production of refined petroleum products”219 
or (2) provides Iran with refined petroleum products or support that could 
enhance Iran’s ability to import refined petroleum products.220  Congress 
expanded the scope of sanctions under section 5(a) yet again with the Iran 
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA),221 which 
extended the required sanctions to any entity that (1) participates in a joint 
venture with Iran with respect to the development of petroleum resources 
outside Iran,222 (2) supports Iran’s ability to develop domestic petroleum 
resources or domestic production of refined petroleum products,223 
(3) supports Iran’s domestic production of petrochemical products,224 
(4) transports crude oil from Iran,225 or (5) conceals the Iranian origin of 
crude oil or refined petroleum products transported on a vessel in which the 
entity has an interest.226 
In addition to specifying the required sanctions and the entities to which 
those sanctions must be applied, Congress also identified in the Iran 
Sanctions Act the circumstances under which the President would no longer 
be obliged to impose sanctions.  Congress provided that “[t]he requirement 
under section 5(a) to impose sanctions shall no longer have force or effect 
with respect to Iran if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate 
congressional committees that Iran” (1) has ceased its efforts to develop or 
to acquire nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as well as ballistic 
missiles, (2) has been removed from the list of countries that support 
international terrorism, and (3) “poses no significant threat to United States 
national security, interests, or allies.”227 
If the President cannot make such certifications, the Act allows more 
limited case-by-case waivers of the mandatory sanctions where the President 
certifies that national security interests require a waiver.  Section 9(c) of the 
Iran Sanctions Act provides that “[t]he President may waive, on a case-by-
case basis and for a period of not more than one year, the requirement in 
section 5(a) to impose a sanction or sanctions” if “the President determines 
and so reports to the appropriate congressional committees that it is essential 
to the national security interests of the United States to exercise such waiver 
 
 218. Pub. L. No. 111-195, § 102, 124 Stat. 1312, 1317 (2010) (codified as amended at 22 
U.S.C. §§ 8501–8551 (2012)). 
 219. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note sec. 5(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V 2006). 
 220. Id. § 1701 note sec. 5(a)(3). 
 221. Pub. L. No. 112-158, 126 Stat. 1214 (2012) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 
note secs. 5–6 (Supp. II 2015) (Iran Sanctions)). 
 222. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note sec. 5(a)(4) (Supp. II 2015) (Iran Sanctions). 
 223. Id. § 1701 note sec. 5(a)(5). 
 224. Id. § 1701 note sec. 5(a)(6). 
 225. Id. § 1701 note sec. 5(a)(7). 
 226. Id. § 1701 note sec. 5(a)(8). 
 227. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note sec. 8 (2012) (Iran Sanctions). 
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authority.”228  The required report under this section requires the President 
to provide “a specific and detailed rationale” for each entity so exempted 
from the penalties under section 5(a).229  The President must supply “a 
description of the conduct that resulted in the determination” that sanctions 
apply to that entity in the first place.230  The President must provide, “in the 
case of a foreign person, an explanation of the efforts to secure the 
cooperation of the government with primary jurisdiction over the sanctioned 
person to terminate or, as appropriate, penalize the activities that resulted in 
the determination.”231  He must further provide “an estimate of the 
significance of the conduct of the person in contributing to the ability of Iran 
to” obtain weapons or petroleum products232 as well as “a statement as to the 
response of the United States in the event that the person concerned engages 
in other activities that would be subject to” sanctions.233 
If the President is not pursuing a particular entity while acting in concert 
with its host country—but wants instead to avoid diplomatic fallout from 
sanctioning a foreign national under section 5(a)—the Act provides a more 
general but also more time-limited waiver authority for foreign nationals.  
Section 4(c) provides: 
The President may, on a case by case basis, waive for a period of not more 
than six months the application of section 5(a) with respect to a national of 
a country, if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional 
committees at least 30 days before such waiver is to take effect that such 
waiver is vital to the national security interests of the United States.234 
The President may renew such a waiver “for subsequent periods of not more 
than six months each.”235 
The waiver authority provided by section 4(c) is carefully delimited.  
Waivers must be on a “case by case basis,” are limited to six-month periods, 
and are authorized only when “vital” to national security interests.236  These 
requirements did not appear in the original legislation.237  Rather, Congress 
specifically added such language to section 4(c) as well as other waiver 
 
 228. Id. § 1701 note sec. 9(c)(1)(A). 
 229. Id. § 1701 note sec. 9(c)(2). 
 230. Id. § 1701 note sec. 9(c)(2)(A). 
 231. Id. § 1701 note sec. 9(c)(2)(B). 
 232. Id. § 1701 note sec. 9(c)(2)(C). 
 233. Id. § 1701 note sec. 9(c)(2)(D). 
 234. Id. § 1701 note sec. 4(c)(1)(A). 
 235. Id. § 1701 note sec. 4(c)(2)(B)(i). 
 236. Id. § 1701 note sec. 4(c)(1)(A). 
 237. Originally, section 4(c) provided as follows: 
The President may waive the application of section 5(a) with respect to nationals of 
a country if— 
(1) that country has agreed to undertake substantial measures, including economic 
sanctions, that will inhibit Iran’s efforts to carry out activities described in section 2 
and information required by subsection (b)(1) has been included in a report 
submitted under subsection (b); and 
(2) the President, at least 30 days before the waiver takes effect, notifies the 
appropriate congressional committees of his intention to exercise the waiver. 
50 U.S.C. § 1701 note sec. 4(c) (2000) (Iran and Libya Sanctions). 
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provisions to clarify its intention that waiver authority “shall be case by case 
and shall not be used as a general waiver.”238  Congress amended section 4(c) 
to add the “case by case” proviso, the time limitation, and the “vital” standard 
when it adopted the Iran Freedom Support Act of 2006 (IFSA).239  The 
tightening of waiver authority responded to the use of that authority by the 
Clinton administration to exempt companies in the European Union from 
sanctions related to Iran’s energy sector.240  Members of Congress insisted 
that the statute authorized waivers only with respect to individual entities and 
that “there was no provision in ILSA for extending the waiver to the entire 
continent nor was there ever intended to be.”241  Accordingly, Congress 
clarified that waivers could be granted only on an individualized and time-
limited basis.242  Congress also created a heightened standard for invoking a 
national security justification for waiver.243  The “vital” standard represented 
a higher threshold than the “important to the security interests of the United 
States” standard, which Congress had used elsewhere,244 or the lack of a 
standard appearing in the original section 4(c).245 
Despite Congress’s intent in section 4(c) to authorize waivers only on an 
individualized, time-limited, and extraordinary basis, the Obama 
administration invoked section 4(c) to cease enforcing sanctions under 
section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act against all non-U.S. nationals for the 
fifteen-year life of the JCPOA.246 
 
 238. H.R. REP. NO. 111-512, at 69 (2010). 
 239. Pub. L. No. 109-293, § 201, 120 Stat. 1344, 1345 (2006) (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. § 1701 note sec. 4(c) (2012) (Iran Sanctions)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-417, at 20 
(2006) (“Subsection (b) amends Section 4(c) of ILSA to provide that waivers of sanctions 
against nationals of countries (including entities) under Section 5(a) of ILSA may be made by 
the President, on a case by case basis, for a period of not more than six months with respect to 
a national of a country, if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees 
at least 30 days before such waiver is to take effect that:  (A) such waiver is vital to the national 
security interests of the United States; and (B) the country of the national has undertaken 
substantial measures to prevent the acquisition and development of weapons of mass 
destruction by the Government of Iran.”). 
 240. H.R. REP. NO. 109-417, at 10 (“In 1998, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
found that an investment by Total, a French firm, in Iran violated ILSA but waived sanctions 
and indicated that additional waivers would be forthcoming if there was cooperation from 
European Union states on non-proliferation matters with respect to Iran.”). 
 241. Enforcement of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act and Increasing Security Threats from 
Iran:  Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on the Middle E. & Cent. Asia of the H. Comm. on 
Int’l Relations, 108th Cong. 4 (2003) (statement of Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chairwoman, 
Subcomm. on the Middle E. & Cent. Asia) (“Secretary Albright . . . went too far in granting 
this waiver.  While statutorily permitted to grant the company a waiver, there was no provision 
in ILSA for extending the waiver to the entire continent, nor was there ever intended to be.”). 
 242. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note sec. 4(c)(1)(A) (2012) (Iran Sanctions). 
 243. See id. 
 244. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 109-417, at 7 (using an “important to the national security 
interests of the United States” standard in the waiver context). 
 245. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note sec. 4(c) (2000) (Iran and Libya Sanctions); see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 111-512, at 46 (2010) (“Among other provisions, the IFSA strengthened sanctions under 
ISA, including raising certain waiver thresholds to ‘vital to the national security interests of 
the United States.’”). 
 246. Kerry, supra note 13, at 4–5; see infra notes 287–88 and accompanying text. 
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2.  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 
In Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2012, Congress expanded its use of financial sanctions to target the Iranian 
Central Bank and Iranian oil exports.247  Congress designated “[t]he financial 
sector of Iran, including the Central Bank of Iran,” as “a primary money 
laundering concern.”248  Congress mandated in the 2012 National Defense 
Authorization law that “[t]he President shall . . . block and prohibit all 
transactions in all property and interests in property of an Iranian financial 
institution” if such property is subject to U.S. jurisdiction.249  Congress 
further required that the President “shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or 
impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a 
correspondent account . . . by a foreign financial institution that the President 
determines has knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant financial 
transaction with the Central Bank of Iran.”250 
Again, Congress specified the circumstances under which these sanctions 
would no longer be required.  Congress provided that the sanctions “shall 
terminate” thirty days after the President certifies to Congress that “the 
Government of Iran has ceased providing support for acts of international 
terrorism and no longer satisfies the requirements for designation as a state 
sponsor of terrorism” and that “Iran has ceased the pursuit, acquisition, and 
development of, and verifiably dismantled its, nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch 
technology.”251 
If the conditions for this sunset provision are not met, the 2012 National 
Defense Authorization Act provides for limited waivers.  To reward 
international cooperation with the sanctions regime, the sanctions “shall not 
apply” to a financial transaction involving a foreign financial institution if its 
host country “has significantly reduced its volume of crude oil purchases 
from Iran.”252  If neither the sunset provision nor this exception apply, and 
the President still believes that the strict application of sanctions would 
jeopardize national security interests, he may waive the imposition of 
sanctions pursuant to section 1245(d)(5) “for a period of not more than 120 
days, and may renew that waiver for additional periods of not more than 120 
days, if the President” determines that a waiver “is in the national security 
interest of the United States” and submits a report to Congress that 
 
 247. Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1245, 125 Stat. 1298, 1647–50 (2011) (codified as amended at 
22 U.S.C. § 8513a (Supp. IV 2017)). 
 248. 22 U.S.C. § 8513a(b) (2012). 
 249. Id. § 8513a(c).  Congress said the President shall do so pursuant to the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, which generally empowers the President to impose 
economic sanctions at his discretion. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707 (2012).  Congress made this 
sanction mandatory. 22 U.S.C. § 8513a(c). 
 250. 22 U.S.C. § 8513a(d)(1)(A). 
 251. Id. § 8513a(i) (providing that “[t]he provisions of this section shall terminate on the 
date that is 30 days after the date on which the President submits to Congress the certification 
described in section 8551(a) of this title”); see also id. § 8551(a) (describing the required 
certification). 
 252. Id. § 8513a(d)(4)(D). 
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(1) provides “a justification for the waiver,” (2) certifies “that the country 
with primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution otherwise 
subject to the sanctions faced exceptional circumstances that prevented the 
country from being able to reduce significantly its purchases of petroleum 
and petroleum products from Iran,” and (3) specifies “any concrete 
cooperation the President has received or expects to receive as a result of the 
waiver.”253 
Again, Congress made the waiver provision more restrictive over time.  
The original section 1245(d)(5) contained no requirement that the President 
certify “exceptional circumstances” on the part of the host country.254  
Congress amended section 1245(d)(5) to add this requirement when it passed 
the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA) as part of 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.255  The 
amendment “insert[ed] an additional determination the President is required 
to make when issuing a waiver of sanctions with respect to petroleum 
transactions.”256  Under the provision, the President is “required, prior to 
issuing a waiver of sanctions, to certify that the country with primary 
jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution otherwise subject to the 
sanctions faced exceptional circumstances that prevented the country from 
being able to significantly reduce its volume of crude oil purchases.”257  The 
provision demonstrates Congress’s intent to authorize a presidential waiver 
only with respect to an individual “foreign financial institution.”258  The 
requirement that the President make specific findings about the institution’s 
host country is incompatible with a blanket waiver that extends to entities in 
multiple countries.  Nevertheless, the Obama administration invoked section 
1245(d)(5) to waive the imposition of sanctions under section 1245 with 
respect to all foreign financial institutions.259 
3.  Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 
In addition to the amendments to the Iran Sanctions Act discussed 
above,260 the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 
(TRA) includes freestanding provisions that impose additional sanctions.261  
Section 212 of the Act provides that “the President shall impose [five] or 
more” of the financial sanctions outlined in the Iran Sanctions Act on any 
entity that “provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance for the 
National Iranian Oil Company, the National Iranian Tanker Company, or a 
 
 253. Id. § 8513a(d)(5). 
 254. Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1245(d)(5), 125 Stat. 1298, 1649 (2011). 
 255. Pub. L. No. 112-239, sec. 1250, § 1245(d)(5)(B), 126 Stat. 1632, 2016–17 (2013) 
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 8513(a) (2012)); see infra note 266. 
 256. H.R. REP. NO. 112-705, at 907 (2012). 
 257. Id. 
 258. See id. 
 259. The waiver excludes transactions involving persons on the Treasury Department’s 
Specially Designated Nationals List. Kerry, supra note 13, at 4; see also infra notes 299–300. 
 260. See supra notes 221–26 and accompanying text. 
 261. 22 U.S.C. §§ 8722–8723 (2012). 
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successor entity to either such company.”262  Section 213 provides that “[t]he 
President shall impose [five] or more of the sanctions” on any entity that 
“purchases, subscribes to, or facilitates the issuance” of “sovereign debt of 
the Government of Iran”—or “debt of any entity owned or controlled by 
Iran”—including bonds.263  For these sanctions, the Iran Threat Reduction 
Act adopts by reference the same sunset and waiver provisions as the Iran 
Sanctions Act.264  The Obama administration invoked the waiver provisions 
to cease the imposition of sanctions under sections 212 and 213 to all non-
U.S. nationals.265 
4.  Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 
Four sections of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 
(IFCA)266 further expand the nuclear-related sanctions regime applicable to 
Iran.  Section 1244 designates as “entities of proliferation concern” all 
“[e]ntities that operate ports in Iran and entities in the energy, shipping, and 
shipbuilding sectors of Iran, including the National Iranian Oil Company, the 
National Iranian Tanker Company, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping 
Lines, and their affiliates” because of Congress’s determination that those 
institutions “play an important role in Iran’s nuclear proliferation efforts.”267  
Accordingly, section 1244(c)(1) mandates that “the President shall block and 
prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property” of any entity 
that is part of the Iranian energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors; that 
operates a port in Iran; or that provides support to any such entity.268  Section 
1244(d) requires the President to apply at least five of the sanctions specified 
in the Iran Sanctions Act to any entity that engages in trade related to the 
Iranian energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors269 and to restrict the 
maintenance in the United States of a correspondent account for any financial 
institution that facilities such trade.270  Congress indicated in section 
1244(h)(2) that these sanctions “shall apply to a foreign financial institution 
that conducts or facilitates a financial transaction for the sale, supply, or 
transfer to or from Iran of natural gas” except under specified 
circumstances.271  The President may waive the imposition of sanctions 
under section 1244 “for a period of not more than 180 days, and may renew 
 
 262. Id. § 8722(a).  For those financial sanctions, see supra note 216. 
 263. 22 U.S.C. § 8723(a). 
 264. Id. § 8722(d) (providing that those “provisions of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as 
amended by this Act, apply with respect to the imposition of sanctions under subsection (a) to 
the same extent that such provisions apply with respect to the imposition of sanctions under 
section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996”); id. § 8723(b) (same); see supra notes 227–
35 and accompanying text. 
 265. Kerry, supra note 13, at 4. 
 266. The IFCA was adopted as Title XII, Subtitle D, of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, §§ 1244–1247 (2012) (codified as amended at 
22 U.S.C. §§ 8803–8806 (2012). 
 267. 22 U.S.C § 8803(b). 
 268. Id. § 8803(c)(1); see also id. § 8803(c)(2) (defining covered entities). 
 269. Id. § 8803(d)(1). 
 270. Id. § 8803(d)(2). 
 271. Id. § 8803(h)(2). 
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that waiver for additional periods of not more than 180 days,” if the President 
“determines that such a waiver is vital to the national security of the United 
States” and “submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
providing a justification for the waiver.”272 
Section 1245 requires the President to apply at least five of the sanctions 
described in the Iran Sanctions Act to any entity that engages in trade with 
Iran involving precious metals and other specified materials.273  The section 
also directs the President to restrict the maintenance of a correspondent 
account for any foreign financial institution that facilities such trade.274  
Congress was apparently concerned that Iran was using such materials to 
alleviate the impact of economic sanctions.  It required the President to 
publish a periodic report on whether Iran was using the specified materials 
“as a medium for barter, swap, or any other exchange or transaction” or was 
listing such materials “as assets of the Government of Iran for purposes of 
the national balance sheet of Iran.”275  Congress also directed the President 
to report on which sectors of the Iranian economy are controlled by Iran’s 
Revolutionary Guard Corps and which of the specified materials are used in 
connection with Iran’s nuclear, military, or ballistic missile programs.276  The 
President may waive the imposition of sanctions under section 1245 “for a 
period of not more than 180 days, and may renew that waiver for additional 
periods of not more than 180 days,” if the President “determines that such a 
waiver is vital to the national security of the United States” and “submits to 
the appropriate congressional committees a report providing a justification 
for the waiver.”277 
Section 1246 mandates the application of five sanctions specified in the 
Iran Sanctions Act to entities that provide underwriting or insurance services 
for any sanctioned activity or entity—including activities in the energy, 
shipping, and shipbuilding sectors and trade in specified materials.278  The 
President may waive the imposition of sanctions under section 1246 “for a 
period of not more than 180 days, and may renew that waiver for additional 
periods of not more than 180 days,” if the President “determines that such a 
waiver is vital to the national security of the United States” and “submits to 
the appropriate congressional committees a report providing a justification 
for the waiver.”279 
 
 272. Id. § 8803(i)(1). 
 273. Id. § 8804(a)(1); see also id. § 8804(d) (“Materials described in this subsection are 
graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for 
integrating industrial processes.”). 
 274. Id. § 8804(c). 
 275. Id. § 8804(e) (“Not later than 180 days after January 2, 2013, and every 180 days 
thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and publish 
in the Federal Register a report that contains the determination of the President with respect to 
[these issues].”). 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. § 8804(g)(1). 
 278. Id. § 8805(a)(1). 
 279. Id. § 8805(e)(1). 
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Section 1247 requires the President to prohibit any correspondent account 
by a foreign financial institution that has “knowingly facilitated a significant 
financial transaction on behalf of any Iranian person included on the list of 
specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office 
of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury.”280  The 
President may waive the imposition of sanctions under section 1247 “for a 
period of not more than 180 days, and may renew that waiver for additional 
periods of not more than 180 days,” if the President “determines that such a 
waiver is vital to the national security of the United States” and “submits to 
the appropriate congressional committees a report providing a justification 
for the waiver.”281 
The use of the “vital” standard in the waiver provisions of the IFCA 
contrasts with more lax standards used in other portions of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which allow executive 
officials to waive other requirements upon a determination that “it is in the 
national security interest of the United States to do so.”282  These provisions, 
which the Obama administration invoked to waive the corresponding 
sanctions provisions of the IFCA,283 entail a high burden of justification. 
B.  Bypassing the Legislative Framework 
Over a long period, Congress entrenched, expanded, and fine-tuned the 
sanctions regime targeted at Iran’s nuclear program.  All the sanctions 
provisions discussed in the preceding Part remain binding law.284  Yet when 
President Obama signed the JCPOA, the President agreed that “[t]he United 
States commits to cease the application of . . . all nuclear-related sanctions” 
as specified in annex II of the agreement, which identifies the statutory 
provisions designed to deny Iran access to the international financial system 
and to prevent the development of its energy and shipping sectors.285 
To follow through on the commitment made in the JCPOA, the President 
purported to exercise the waiver provision applicable to each sanction in 
order to cease enforcing the nuclear-related sanctions altogether.  Secretary 
 
 280. Id. § 8806(a).  The sanction does not apply to an Iranian financial institution that has 
not been designated for the imposition of sanctions in connection with Iran’s proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, support for international terrorism, or abuses of human rights. 
Id. § 8806(b). 
 281. Id. § 8806(f)(1). 
 282. Compare National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-
239, § 1228(c)(2), 126 Stat. 1632, 2002 (2013), with id. § 913(c)(1) sec. 2277(c)(3)(B), 126 
Stat. at 1876, and id. § 1028(d)(1)(D), 126 Stat. at 1916, and id. § 1227(d)(2), 126 Stat. at 
2001. 
 283. See Kerry, supra note 13, at 1. 
 284. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 8501–8551 (2012); 22 U.S.C. §§ 8701–8795 (2012); 22 U.S.C. 
§§ 8803–8806 (2012); 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (2012); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707 (2012). 
 285. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, supra note 1, annex II, at 8.  The agreement notes 
that “[t]he sanctions that the United States will cease to apply . . . pursuant to its commitment 
under [the JCPOA] are those directed towards non-U.S. persons.” Id. at 8 n.6.  U.S. persons 
and U.S.-controlled entities remain generally prohibited from conducting transactions with 
Iran, unless the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Treasury Department authorizes them 
to do so. Id. 
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Kerry wrote to Congress on behalf of the President to invoke the eight 
different waiver provisions.286  Pursuant to section 4(c) of the Iran Sanctions 
Act, for example, Secretary Kerry purported to “find that it is vital to the 
national security interests of the United States to issue waivers regarding the 
application of sanctions” under section 5(a) “for transactions by non-U.S. 
nationals in cases where the transactions are for activities described in 
[specified provisions] of Annex II of the JCPOA.”287  The specified 
provisions of Annex II, in turn, describe all the activities that are sanctionable 
under section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act.288  Each description of an 
activity is listed alongside the provision of U.S. law that sanctions that 
activity, indicating that the intent is to end enforcement of the applicable legal 
provision.289 
In other words, President Obama invoked the various waiver provisions—
some of which explicitly must be applied “on a case by case basis”290 and all 
of which are time-limited291—effectively to repeal seventeen different 
sanctions laws for the fifteen-year life of the JCPOA and presumably 
thereafter.292  It would be difficult to argue that such an action is compatible 
“with the expressed or implied will of Congress” so as to be consistent with 
the Steel Seizure principle.293  First, Congress mandated sanctions that had 
previously been subject to the President’s discretionary authority under 
IEEPA.294  Second, Congress limited the President’s ability to waive 
sanctions to individual cases, to individual sanctions provisions, and to 
limited periods of time.295  Third, Congress provided sunset provisions that 
specified the conditions under which the President could cease applying 
sanctions altogether—conditions that were not met prior to the JCPOA.296  
Even if there might be some room to debate the scope of a permissible waiver, 
the presence of these sunset provisions indicates that the scope must be 
something short of wholesale suspension, which the President purported to 
accomplish in agreeing to the JCPOA. 
 
 286. Kerry, supra note 13. 
 287. Id. at 4–5. 
 288. See Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, supra note 1, annex II, at 9–10 (committing 
to end “[s]anctions on the provision of underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance in 
connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA”; “[e]fforts to reduce Iran’s crude oil 
sales, including limitations on the quantities of Iranian crude oil sold and the nations that can 
purchase Iranian crude oil”; “[s]anctions on investment, including participation in joint 
ventures, goods, services, information, technology and technical expertise and support for 
Iran’s oil, gas, and petrochemical sectors”; “[s]anctions on the export, sale or provision of 
refined petroleum products and petrochemical products to Iran”; and “[s]anctions on 
associated services for each of the categories”). 
 289. See id. 
 290. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra notes 234–35, 253–55, 264, 272, 277, 279, 281 and accompanying text. 
 292. Kerry, supra note 13. 
 293. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
 294. See supra Part III.A; see also supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra Part III.A. 
 296. See supra notes 227, 251, 264 and accompanying text. 
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Defenders of the President’s strategy suggest that if Congress did not want 
the President to be able effectively to repeal the sanctions legislation it 
passed, Congress should not have provided waiver authority to the 
President.297  But this position implies that Congress’s only option was to 
mandate an inflexible sanctions regime that made no allowance for national 
security exceptions.  Short of a flat-out bar on executive discretion, it is 
unclear what else Congress could have done to implement a policy of 
imposing sanctions but allowing waivers in particularized circumstances.  
Congress cannot feasibly or constitutionally retain a veto over the President’s 
waiver decisions.298  The most it can responsibly do is what it did in the Iran 
sanctions legislation it enacted:  require the President to provide a detailed 
justification for each waiver so he is required to focus on individual 
circumstances case by case and limit the length of the waiver period so that 
the President must periodically return to Congress to justify his decision. 
With his blanket waivers of sanctions, President Obama does not appear 
to have complied even with these modest requirements.  In waiving sanctions 
under the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, for example, the 
President did not submit a report to Congress “certifying that the country with 
primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution otherwise subject to 
the sanctions faced exceptional circumstances that prevented the country 
from being able to reduce significantly its purchases of petroleum and 
petroleum products from Iran”299 and “that includes any concrete cooperation 
the President has received or expects to receive as a result of the waiver.”300  
The President did not and could not provide such individualized reports for 
all the financial institutions that would be subject to sanctions in the absence 
of his waiver because it is not possible to identify them all.  That is the point.  
Requiring individualized reports makes clear that Congress has authorized 
only individualized waivers—that is, waivers “on a case by case basis”301—
which is apparent from reading the provisions reasonably in context.  If the 
JCPOA experience leads to Congress writing stricter statutes with less 
flexibility, it would not be because Congress erred in giving the President too 
much waiver authority but because the President failed to respect the limited 
character of the waiver provisions Congress enacted in the first place. 
This is not a question of the President merely failing to dot i’s or cross t’s.  
The Steel Seizure principle requires the President to respect “the plan 
Congress adopted”302 or, in other words, “the expressed or implied will of 
 
 297. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, More Weak Arguments for the Illegality of the Iran Deal, 
LAWFARE (July 27, 2015, 2:46 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/more-weak-arguments-
illegality-iran-deal [https://perma.cc/DTH5-VCCC] (“The Deal may well show that Congress 
has delegated or acquiesced in the expansion of too much presidential power.  Perhaps 
Congress will draw lessons from and act on that realization—but I doubt it.”). 
 298. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding legislative vetoes to be 
unconstitutional). 
 299. 22 U.S.C. § 8513a(d)(5)(B)(ii) (2012); see also id. § 8513a(d)(4)(D); supra note 255 
and accompanying text. 
 300. 22 U.S.C. § 8513a(d)(5)(B)(iii); see supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
 302. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 586 (1952). 
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Congress.”303  It resembles a preemption analysis.  If Congress has legislated 
a framework to govern a particular area, erecting an alternative framework 
requires new legislation and cannot be accomplished by executive action 
alone.304  The President might have discretion to act where the field is 
open,305 but where Congress has acted, it has, in effect, occupied the field—
and the President is correspondingly constrained. 
The President’s unilateral commitments in the JCPOA disregarded the 
congressional policy framework in violation of the separation of powers.  
Congress adopted a plan for the imposition of sanctions and for impeding the 
Iranian nuclear program—just as Congress, in Steel Seizure, had adopted 
policies for the seizure of property as a means of dealing with labor disputes.  
The President, in both cases, sought to address the same issues by acting 
contrary to the congressional plan.306  The JCPOA might have represented a 
different circumstance if Congress had not entered the field—if Congress, for 
example, had never adopted mandatory sanctions on Iran but left the matter 
to executive discretion.  But Congress did legislate in that area, and its plan 
remains law until it is changed by statute or by treaty. 
C.  The Foreign Subsidiary Loophole 
It turns out that Congress did not authorize even case-by-case waivers for 
every aspect of the sanctions regime.  White House lawyers apparently 
wondered whether the JCPOA could be implemented without legislative 
changes because of the so-called “‘foreign sub’ loophole.”307  Prior to 2012, 
foreign subsidiaries of American companies were not prohibited from 
transacting business with Iran.308  Congress closed this “loophole” when it 
adopted the TRA, which in section 218 made American parent companies 
liable for the conduct of foreign subsidiaries.309 
In the JCPOA, the President agreed effectively to restore the foreign 
subsidiary loophole by committing to “[l]icense non-U.S. entities that are 
owned or controlled by a U.S. person to engage in activities with Iran that are 
 
 303. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 304. Provided, of course, that Congress had the authority to legislate in the first place. 
 305. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra Parts I.A, III.B.  
 307. James Rosen, Exclusive:  U.S. Officials Conclude Iran Deal Violates Federal Law, 
FOX NEWS (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/10/08/exclusive-us-
officials-conclude-iran-deal-violates-federal-law.html [https://perma.cc/AF56-8D8G].  
 308. During the 2015 Republican primary, the foreign-sub loophole was featured in the 
news when criticism emerged that while Carly Fiorina was CEO of Hewlett-Packard, the 
company sold printers and other equipment to Iran. See Josh Rogin, Fiorina’s HP Earned 
Millions from Sales in Iran, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 14, 2015, 3:45 PM), 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-09-14/under-fiorina-hp-earned-millions-from-
sales-in-iran [https://perma.cc/TVT2-947G].  It turned out that a subsidiary of Hewlett-
Packard based in the Netherlands sold the equipment to a distributor based in the United Arab 
Emirates before it finally reached Iran. Id.  Though Hewlett-Packard was itself prohibited from 
transacting with Iran, this arrangement did not violate American law at the time. Id. 
 309. Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-158, 
§ 218, 126 Stat. 1214, 1234 (2012) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 8725 (2012)).  
President Obama implemented section 218 by executive order in October 2012. Exec. Order 
No. 13,628, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,139 (Oct. 12, 2012). 
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consistent with this JCPOA.”310  Section 218 of the TRA lacks a waiver 
provision altogether.  It terminates only upon the President’s certification that 
“the Government of Iran has ceased providing support for acts of 
international terrorism and no longer satisfies the requirements for 
designation as a state sponsor of terrorism” and that “Iran has ceased the 
pursuit, acquisition, and development of, and verifiably dismantled its, 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and ballistic 
missile launch technology.”311  President Obama did not make this 
certification. 
The White House reportedly settled on an alternative legal theory that 
purportedly allows the reopening of the loophole without turning to 
Congress.  The TRA provides that “[t]he President may exercise all 
authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act to carry out” provisions of the TRA.312  
Because the IEEPA authorizes the President to license foreign subsidiaries to 
trade with Iran, the argument goes, the reference to the IEEPA means that the 
TRA allows him to exercise that authority.313  The Office of Foreign Assets 
Control at the Treasury Department therefore authorized foreign entities 
owned or controlled by U.S. persons to transact business with Iran.314 
The White House’s argument, at least as reported in the press, is not 
compelling.  The TRA authorizes the use of the President’s IEEPA 
authorities “to carry out” the TRA, including section 218.315  It is strange to 
read that phrase as meaning “to cancel out” the specific requirements of 
section 218.  The President’s annulment of section 218 is a small part of the 
overall JCPOA framework.  But the lack of a justification for the 
nonenforcement of that provision further demonstrates that President 
Obama’s commitments in the JCPOA clash with the congressional 
framework and require legislation to be properly implemented. 
D.  The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act 
During negotiations but before the conclusion of the JCPOA, Congress 
passed the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (“Review Act”).316  
The Review Act required the President to transmit the agreement, once 
reached, to Congress for review.317  Congress then had a sixty-day review 
period during which it could adopt a joint resolution of approval or 
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disapproval or take no action.318  The President was prohibited from waiving 
or otherwise limiting the application of statutory sanctions during the sixty-
day review period.319  As it happened, a majority in the House voted to 
disapprove the JCPOA; in the Senate, Democrats prevented a resolution of 
disapproval from reaching a vote.320  The Senate’s avoidance of a vote spared 
the President from having to veto a congressional disapproval.321 
Commentators have suggested that the Review Act amounts to 
congressional authorization of the JCPOA.322  According to this view, the 
Review Act “explicitly grants the Administration authority to negotiate and 
implement binding legal commitments with Iran.”323  Yet the Review Act 
does not provide such authorization.  The statutory text reads as if Congress 
thought it was being unfairly sidelined from Iran policy and desperately 
wanted to reclaim some role in the process.324  “[E]ven though the agreement 
may commence,” it reads, “because the sanctions regime was imposed by 
Congress and only Congress can permanently modify or eliminate that 
regime, it is critically important that Congress have the opportunity, in an 
orderly and deliberative manner, to consider and, as appropriate, take action 
affecting the statutory sanctions regime imposed by Congress.”325 
While the Review Act acknowledges that the President intended to 
continue negotiations and to conclude an agreement, it does not authorize 
those actions.  What the Act accomplished was to require the President to 
submit the details of any agreement to Congress and to prohibit the President 
from implementing the agreement for sixty days so that Congress has an 
opportunity to express an opinion.326 
The Review Act represented an attempt to reclaim a congressional role, 
not to authorize unilateral executive action.  The congressional role could be 
reclaimed only partially because the President had reversed the usual 
lawmaking dynamic.  He was effectively exercising lawmaking authority 
through the JCPOA by requiring Congress to muster the majority support 
needed to pass a law rather than following the normal requirement for the 
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President to demonstrate the overriding political support needed to overturn 
a law.  When in the past Congress has authorized the President to enter into 
executive agreements, it has required congressional approval before those 
agreements go into effect.327  The lack of such a provision in the Review Act 
was not an expression of enthusiasm for the President’s Iran policy but a 
recognition that the President was determined to conclude the deal without 
Congress.328 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
There are two steps to the President’s claim of authority with respect to the 
JCPOA.  The first is his constitutional authority to enter into political 
agreements with foreign states.  The second is his authority under the 
sanctions statutes, with the various waiver provisions, to lift nuclear-related 
Iran sanctions across the board.  Commentary on the President’s legal 
strategy has suggested that these two steps are independent and were satisfied 
in this case—that the President had the authority to conclude a “nonbinding” 
political agreement and separate authority to lift sanctions.329  But if the 
President had not agreed to the JCPOA, could he still have ended 
enforcement of the nuclear-related statutory sanctions against Iran?  That is, 
if there were no agreement with Iran but the President still believed that 
continued enforcement of the sanctions regime was not the correct policy, 
could the President plausibly have invoked the various waiver provisions to 
end sanctions in the across-the-board manner evidenced in the JCPOA and 
thus, in effect, launch his own nonsanctions Iran policy? 
The case for the legality of the President’s action depends on the answer 
to this question being yes.  If it were otherwise, it would mean that a sole 
executive agreement—explicitly treated by the Obama administration as a 
nonbinding political commitment—altered domestic law. 
Yet it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that if the President could not 
invoke compliance with the JCPOA as a pressing national security interest, 
he could not have managed as easily to cease enforcing the congressional 
sanctions regime.  The problem, however, is that the JCPOA is in fact the 
President’s own nonsanctions Iran policy.  It was not approved by Congress 
 
 327. See Julian Ku, Why Professors Ackerman and Golove Are Still Wrong About the Iran 
Deal, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 16, 2015, 8:09 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/09/16/why-
professors-ackerman-and-golove-are-still-wrong-about-the-iran-deal/ 
[https://perma.cc/J8H5-5KUJ] (citing the example of the Trade Promotion Authority Act, 
which authorizes the President to enter into trade agreements but provides that no agreement 
shall enter into force unless an “implementing bill is enacted into law”). 
 328. Congress could not have enacted legislation preventing the JCPOA from going into 
effect without congressional approval because the President would have vetoed such 
legislation. Carney, supra note 324 (noting that the threat of presidential veto prevented 
amendments and stronger provisions in the Review Act). 
 329. Goldsmith, supra note 24, at 466–67 (“[T]he President . . . made political 
commitments that did not require legislative approval and then exercised independent 
domestic authorities to effectuate the changes in domestic law that were needed to make the 
pledges in the . . . commitments credible and efficacious.”). 
2017] TAKING STEEL SEIZURE SERIOUSLY 1245 
or by the public, and it was opposed by majorities of both.330  To allow the 
President’s own Iran policy to trump Congress’s Iran policy is to invest the 
President with a freestanding legislative authority that has no constitutional 
foundation or legal precedent.  In effect, it is to allow the President to reverse 
the usual lawmaking dynamic required by the Constitution. 
In Steel Seizure, President Truman sought to implement his own policy on 
plant seizure as a means of quelling a labor dispute thought to pose a national 
emergency during the Korean War.331  In the case of the JCPOA, President 
Obama initiated his own new no-sanctions policy toward Iran, compliance 
with which he claimed was so “vital to the national security of the United 
States” that it justified nonenforcement of binding domestic law.  Even in 
such circumstances, the Steel Seizure principle requires the President to act 
within the congressional plan, respecting both substantive provisions of law 
and the legislated policy framework.  If the President finds that plan too 
confining, it is his burden to convince Congress to change the law, not 
Congress’s burden to muster supermajorities to overturn a threatened veto, 
as occurred in connection with the Iran Review Act.332 
Recent scholarship has focused on the increasing salience of waiver 
provisions in congressional statutes.333  In a leading analysis, Judge David 
Barron and Professor Todd Rakoff coined the term “big waiver” to describe 
the “delegation of the power to unmake major statutory provisions.”334  Such 
delegation of waiver authority has important benefits.  In particular, 
“Congress takes ownership of the first draft of a regulatory framework, 
confident that its handiwork will not prove to be rigid and irreversible,” and 
therefore Congress achieves “regulatory flexibility that enables it to codify 
fundamental policy choices that it otherwise might be unwilling (or unable) 
to specify, thereby making legislative policymaking viable.”335  In the 
national security context, such flexibility is especially useful.  Congress may 
specify a baseline sanctions policy, for example, without worrying that the 
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requirement to sanction particular entities might undermine the President’s 
ability to address some future—and unforeseeable—diplomatic crisis. 
For this reason, the national security context has occasioned numerous 
statutes providing for “little waiver,”336 the delegation of “a limited power to 
handle the exceptional case.”337  But what happens when the executive 
attempts to transform its little-waiver authority into big waiver?  It might do 
so either through a broad reading of a narrow waiver provision or the 
simultaneous exercise of a series of little waivers negating the limitations of 
each.  Both of these strategies were necessary to the President’s actions to 
meet his commitments under the JCPOA.  The President interpreted 
provisions allowing waivers on a case-by-case basis to authorize across-the-
board waivers of certain sanctions.  And the President combined the authority 
provided by each waiver provision to grant Iran simultaneous, sweeping 
sanctions relief. 
The JCPOA is not a unique instance of this phenomenon.  In defending the 
grant of work authorization under the Obama administration’s program for 
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents 
(DAPA), for example, the government focused on a provision of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act defining “unauthorized alien” to mean, 
“with respect to the employment of an alien at a particular time,” that the 
alien is not “authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by the Attorney 
General.”338  According to the government, this provision authorized the 
Attorney General to dispense with the elaborate requirements for work 
authorization that the Act lays out.339  The state challengers to DAPA, 
meanwhile, argued that the provision could not be understood to authorize so 
sweeping a waiver as to “grant the Executive power to undo Congress’s 
comprehensive 1986 IRCA reforms with the stroke of a pen.”340  The states 
essentially offered a Steel Seizure argument:  that the waiver provision cannot 
be read to overturn the congressionally specified framework. 
Any conception of “big waiver” must respect limitations inherent in the 
Steel Seizure principle.  Exercises of waiver authority must be consistent with 
the congressional plan:  “Big waiver should . . . have to be justified as being 
within the statutory enactment, as carrying forward one or more of what can 
 
 336. Id. at 287 (“[T]he national security realm has occasioned the delegation of the little 
waiver power in a number of regulatory domains.”). 
 337. Id. at 277. 
 338. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (2012). 
 339. Brief for the Petitioners at 63, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-
674) (arguing that § 1324a(h)(3) “ratifies and independently supports the Secretary’s . . . 
position that he can ‘authorize[]’ aliens to be lawfully employed as a component of the exercise 
of his discretion”). 
 340. Brief for the State Respondents at 53, Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (No. 15-674); see also 
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 182–83 (5th Cir. 2015) (“For the authority to implement 
DAPA, the government relies in part on 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3), a provision that does not 
mention lawful presence or deferred action, and that is listed as a ‘[m]iscellaneous’ definitional 
provision expressly limited to § 1324a, a section concerning the ‘Unlawful employment of 
aliens’—an exceedingly unlikely place to find authorization for DAPA.” (footnote omitted)  
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3)). 
2017] TAKING STEEL SEIZURE SERIOUSLY 1247 
be reasonably thought to be the purposes of the statute.”341  After all, “[i]n 
allowing waivers, Congress . . . did not intend to authorize outright 
cancelation of statutory provisions based on mere executive disagreement 
with statutory requirements.”342  The outer limit of the President’s waiver 
authority, even if authorized, must be that he cannot disregard the legislated 
policy framework in favor of his own independent agenda.343  In addition, 
any waiver authority must be conferred “using relatively clear language.”344  
That is, waiver authority “may not be lightly implied, at least where 
forbearance would result in a ‘fundamental revision’ of the regulatory 
scheme enacted by Congress.”345 
While scholars have suggested these interpretive principles in the 
administrative law context, the use of executive waiver authority pursuant to 
the JCPOA was not subjected to such scrutiny.  In the JCPOA context, the 
President’s exercise of waiver authority was based on a strained and 
expansive reading of the statutory text, and it aimed at a purpose contrary to 
the statute—namely, to abandon sanctions as the policy framework for 
dealing with Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology.  Yet the academic response 
was, essentially, that Congress had gotten what it asked for.  “If Congress 
doesn’t like the position it is in now,” one well-regarded commentator wrote 
at the time of the JCPOA, “it should be more careful when it gives the 
President discretion to implement (and waive) its sanctions.”346  The truth is 
that Congress was careful.  When it added the “case-by-case” language, the 
six-month time limitation, and the “vital to the national security interests of 
the United States” reporting requirement to the waiver provision in the Iran 
Sanctions Act, Congress received criticism for unreasonably confining the 
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President’s waiver discretion.347  Yet Congress nevertheless acted to narrow 
that discretion.348  The argument that Congress has itself to blame for the 
JCPOA amounts to the contention that the President cannot be trusted to 
remain within the bounds of a narrow waiver provision and therefore 
Congress ought never to authorize waivers, at least in the realm of foreign 
affairs.  This is a recipe for irresponsible congressional action that would 
harm relations with foreign states. 
To avoid perilous interbranch competition in which Congress tests the 
limits of directing the President’s activities in foreign affairs through 
inflexible mandates, it makes sense to embrace limits on delegated waiver 
authority with respect to foreign affairs such as have been suggested in the 
administrative law context.349  Controversies over the President’s foreign 
affairs authority are less likely than administrative law matters to end up in 
court, at least when individual rights are not at stake.350  But that means the 
views of the legal culture with respect to presidential waivers are more 
important in this context.351  The President was able to exercise expansive 
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waiver authority in the Iran nuclear agreement because informed 
commentators largely accepted his claim that Congress had already delegated 
authority to the President to suspend the sanctions regime.  The legal culture 
ought to be skeptical of claims that Congress has authorized the executive 
branch to suspend a legal regime and replace it with another of the 
executive’s own making.  Such claims require the President to demonstrate 
textual warrant and consistency with congressional purpose.  Respect for the 
separation of powers, embodied in the Steel Seizure principle, requires no 
less. 
Recent scholarship on “historical gloss” and congressional acquiescence 
to executive action testing the boundaries of separated powers rightly 
emphasizes the practical difficulties Congress faces when trying to act as a 
unitary body to resist perceived executive overreach.352  These logistical 
barriers are part of the constitutional design.  The President has the advantage 
of initiative, both in the foreign relations and domestic spheres.  It is difficult 
for Congress to pass laws, amend or repeal them, or take other action as a 
body to express opposition to executive action.  Even when a course of action 
enjoys majority support in both houses, that may still not be enough 
congressional consensus to override an express or impliedly threatened veto; 
this was the dynamic behind the Iranian Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 
2015. 
The Steel Seizure principle plays an important role in setting the 
appropriate ground rules for such contests over the separation of powers.  
When the executive acts in an area where Congress has been silent or where 
Congress has authorized the executive action, the burden is on the legislative 
branch, with all the practical and logistical hurdles the Constitution and 
institutional history have erected, to enact law circumscribing the President’s 
sphere of action.  Yet when Congress has established a policy framework for 
dealing with the matter, and the President cannot claim an exclusive sphere 
of action,353 the burden is on the President to work within that framework, 
even when addressing relations with foreign states.  “In the framework of our 
Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed 
refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”354 
CONCLUSION 
The President can be viewed both as an agent and, particularly in the 
foreign relations area, as a co-principal with Congress.  The Steel Seizure 
principle highlights the limits of the co-principal conception of the President.  
Once Congress has developed a legislative framework for a subject matter 
within its authority, that framework occupies the field; the President’s role 
becomes one of a responsible agent.  In the Iran sanctions laws, Congress 
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provided bounded waiver authority, acting responsibly to allow limited 
executive discretion rather than requiring the President to seek new 
legislation each time flexibility was needed.  It did not, however, invite the 
President effectively to override the sanctions framework altogether, as 
occurred in connection with the JCPOA.  In general, Congress’s delegation 
of waiver authority to the executive branch may provide needed flexibility.  
Yet the President’s exercise of waiver authority must be carefully 
circumscribed to avoid the problem of the President revising a statutory 
regime out of disagreement with Congress’s policy choices.  Limiting 
principles are no less necessary in the foreign affairs context, where the 
President has used purported waiver authority in the Iran sanctions statutes 
to pursue his own independent policy in defiance of Congress. 
